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The exchange rate has by the mid-1980s become as central in United
States economic policy discussions as it has long been in the rest of
the world. Economists argue that the rapid dollar appreciation in the
current disinflation has contributed powerfully to the speed ofthe dis-
inflation. The 1984 Economic Report of the President fears that the
"overvalued" dollar creates an unbalanced recovery by curtailing ex-
port growth and fears also that large current account deficits will lead
to a depreciation of the exchange rate that will contribute to a resur-
gence ofinflation.
As the Bretton Woods system came under increasing pressure in the
196Os, economic policymaking became more constrained by balance
of payments and exchange rate considerations. Supporters of a shift
to flexible exchange rates-and by the end this included most econo-
mists-believed that a shift to floating rates would enable countries to
insulate themselves from foreign disturbances. That did not happen.
One reason is that the dominance of supply shocks in the 1970s was
certainly not foreseen: real shocks will be transmitted between coun-
tries under both fixed and flexible rates. A second reason is that with
different speeds of adjustment of assets and goods markets, shifts in
monetary policy produce real rather than merely nominal exchange
rate changes.
We start by describing trends and cycles in United States interna-
tionallinkages, in goods, factor, and asset markets. We then develop
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the analysis ofthe operationoffiscal and monetary policy in the current
flexible rate environment.
8.1 The External Linkages: Trends and Cycles
The United States economy is linked to the rest ofthe world through
goods, factor, and assets markets. The linkages are reflected in the
flows ofgoods and services in international trade; in the relationships
between goods and factor prices at home and abroad; and in the asset
pricing and capital flow relationships between domestic and foreign
assets markets. This section documents trends and cycles in these
linkages.
We start with summary measures of the degree of coordination of
business cycles in different periods. Morgenstern (1959) calculated the
percentage ofmonths when business cycles in the United States, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom were in the same phase in the
periods 1879-1914 and 1919-32. In the pre-World War I period busi-
ness cycles in the four countries were in the same phase 54% of the
time; in the interwar period the phases coincided only 36% ofthe time.
Working with the same four countries, over the period 1953 to 1980
we find business cycle phases coinciding 35% ofthe time.} There is no
substantial difference in the measure ofcoincidence between the fixed
and flexible exchange rate periods after World War 11. 2 Thus business
cycles seem to have been more coordinated internationally during the
vintage gold standard period than subsequently. But the data are too
crude and the differences too small to provide strong support for the
view that the truly fixed exchange rates provided by the gold standard
linked countries together more closely than the less reliable exchange
rate arrangements of subsequent periods.
8.1.1 Trade in Goods and Services
Table 8.1 presents summary data on trade in goods and services for
over a century. Data are expressed as a percentage ofGNP. The table
shows exports and imports of goods and net exports of services: net
exports ofgoods plus net services exports constitute net exports in the
national income accounts, shown as the fourth column in table 8.1.
The current account is not shown in the table. The main difference
between net exports (NIPA) and the current account is the inclusion
1. Calculations are based on growth cycle chronologies reported in Klein and Moore
1983.
2. However, including the years 1981-83 might tilt the balance to the conclusion that
business cycles have been more coordinated in the flexible rate period than in the fixed
rate period.461 The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Table 8.1 United States Trade and Tariffs, 1869-1983
Period IMGIGNP EXGIGNP NSERIGNP NXIGNP TAR/IMG
1869-76 7.7 6.6 -0.8 -2.0 35.1
1877-86 5.9 7.4 -0.9 0.7 29.8
1887-96 6.0 6.5 -1.3 -0.8 25.5
1897-1906 4.4 6.8 -0.8 1.7 26.3
1907-14 4.5 5.9 -0.8 0.7 19.7
1915-19 4.7 9.6 0.2 5.1 8.1
1920-29 4.4 5.6 0.4 1.6 13.0
1930-39 2.9 3.5 0.2 0.8 17.0
1940-49 2.3 3.8 0.0 1.5 9.7
1950-69 3.1 3.8 0.3 1.0 6.6
1970-73 4.6 4.5 0.7 0.5 5.9
1974-77 7.1 6.7 1.3 0.8 3.8
1978-83 8.4 7.2 1.7 0.4 3.5
Note: Data are expressed as a percentage of GNP for imports ofgoods (IMG), exports
ofgoods (EXG), net exports ofservices (NSER), and net exports (NX). The last column
shows tariff proceeds as a percentage of total imports of goods.
Sources: For the years to 1929, Historical Statistics ofthe United States, part 2, series
U201, U202, U211, Ul, U2, U8, U9.
in the latterofunilateral transfers and ofgovernment interest payments
to the rest of the world.
The most striking point is the extent to which the United States
economy has, from the viewpoint oftrade in goods and services, been
closed. Even back into the nineteenth century, neither exports nor
imports exceeded 10% of GNP for any substantial period. Merchan-
dise exports peaked as a percentage of GNP during World War I,
falling in the 1920s to lower levels than ever before, and then in the
1930s and well into the 1960s remaining even below 4% of GNP. The
merchandise trade balance was in surplus for a long time, but in the
past decade it has moved into a large and growing deficit. Despite
the doubling in the shares of both imports and exports in GNP since
the 1950s, the United States remains the most closed ofall industrial-
ized countries.
The average rate of tariffs has fallen substantially over the past
century. But the decline was not monotonic: tariff acts punctuated
the generally declining trend, notably in this century the Fordney-
McCumber tariff of 1922 and the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930. 3 The
effect of the Smoot-Hawley tariff on the domestic economy will be
discussed below.
3. Column 5 oftable 8.1 gi.ves the ratio oftariffrevenues to imports ofgoods, dutiable
and nondutiable. Such measures are imperfect indicators of the level of tariffs, as ex-
emplified by the fact that a prohibitive tariff would have no weight in an index of this
type.462 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
The cyclical behavior ofimports and exports (goods and services) is
summarized in table 8.2, which presents correlations among the growth
rate of real GNP, the growth rates of (real) exports and imports, and
the change in the share of net exports in GNP over different periods.
The consistent result is that imports are, as would be expected from
the effects of aggregate demand on imports, procyclical. The cyclical
behavior of exports varies over the different periods shown in table
8.2. There is no expectation ofa consistent cyclical pattern in the case
of exports: the correlation depends on the coordination of domestic
and foreign business cycles and on whether a particular expansion is
domestically led or export led. Net exports tend to move in an anti-
cyclical direction, driven by the positive relationship between imports
and the cycle. However, in periods in which exportgrowth is positively
correlated with GNP growth, as for 1954-83, net exports can on bal-
ance move procyclically.
The correlation results oftable 8.2 agree with the findings ofMintz,
who examined the cyclical behavior ofexports, imports, and the trade
balance over periods extending back to 1879. Mintz shows imports
peaking at business cycles peaks and at their lowest at the trough.4
Exports, by contrast, she shows not to have a consistent cyclical pat-
tern, being strongly procyclical in the interwar period but peaking well
after the business cycle peak in the pre-World War I era. The trade
balance was on average countercyclical.
Figure 8.1 shows the trade balance and the current account as a
percentage of GNP over the period since 1946. The eye may see a
generally deteriorating current account in figure 8.1, but more careful
examination suggests that the enormous surpluses ofthe World War II
era had been worked off by the end of the Korean War and that the
current account then fluctuated around a basic surplus ofabout 1% of
GNP until a marked deterioration took place at the end ofthe period.
The absence ofany strong cyclical behavior ofnet exports in table 8.2
Table 8.2 Cyclical Behavior of Imports and Exports
1930-83 1946-73 1954-83
















Note: Data are correlation coefficients. Variables are year-to-year growth rates of real
GNP (GNP72GR), real imports (M72GR), and exports (EX72GR) and the change in the
share of net exports in GNP (DNXSH).
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is reflected in the differing behaviorofthe trade balance (and the current
account) from cycle to cycle. The trade balance improved during the
recessions in 1954, 1960, 1970, and 1980 and worsenedduring the reces-
sions of 1957, 1973-75, and 1982.
Althoughthe UnitedStatesis, bythe criterionofthe sharesofexports
and imports in GNP, the most closed of the Western economies, it is
not closed at the margin. Tariffs have declined to very low levels and
leave only a few areas in which domestic industries are sheltered from
foreign competition, except where quotas or their equivalent in the
form of voluntary export restraints (automobiles, steel, textiles, etc.)
have been imposed. Estimates of the income elasticity of aggregate
imports are typically in the range of 1.5 to 2. Export shares in GNP
have also fluctuated substantially.464 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
Table 8.3 presents a measure ofthe variability ofcomponents ofGNP
over the period 1954 to 1983. The underlying data are year-to-year
changes in the ratio of each category of spending to GNP, expressed
in percent.5 The data in table 8.3 are the variances of those changes.
Exports and imports each vary less than the othercomponents ofGNP
in absolute terms, but despite the low average ratios of imports and
exports to GNP, their year-to-year variability is of the same order of
magnitude as that ofthe remaining expenditure categories.
Shifts in the competitiveness ofthe United States relative to its trad-
ing partners are among the major determinants ofmerchandise trade.
Competitiveness is shown in figure 8.2 by an index ofthe United States
value-added deflator in manufacturing compared to the exchange-rate-
adjusted, trade-weighted deflators ofpartner countri·es in international
trade.6 Note in figure 8.2 the large adjustment in the measure ofcom-
petitiveness in the period 1971-73, in the transitionto flexible exchange
rates. The magnitude ofthe adjustment and its persistence demonstrate
that the Bretton Woods system had led to a cumulative overvaluation
ofthe dollar. Even after the rapid appreciation ofthe dollar in the early
1980s the real exchange rate is still well above its 1970 level.
Tables 8.4 and 8.5 show long-term shifts in the composition and
direction ofUnited States merchandise trade. The long-term shifts are,
on the side ofexports, entirely as expected. The United States shifted
from exporting primarily food and raw materials in the past century to
manufactures in the twentiethcentury. Even so, there is some tendency
for the share of manufactures to fall in the post-World War II period.
On the import side, raw materials are as significant a share ofimports
now as they were in the world wars; food imports are currently ex-













Note: Data are variances ofthe change in the shares (expressed as a percentage) ofGNP
of consumption (DCSH), fixed investment (DISH), inventory investment (DINVSH),
government spending(DGSH), exports (DEXSH), and imports (DIMSH) forannualdata,
1954-83.
5. We work with changes to remove possible trends in the shares of the different
categories of spending in GNP.
6. The index is of manufacturing prices because the assumption is that agricultural
goods prices, subsidies and tariffs aside, are equal across countries. See International
Financial Statistics for other indexes and a discussion ofthe series. Exchange rates and
measures of competitiveness frequently leave the reader not knowing which way is up.
In this paper we adopt the convention that a depreciation of the dollar appears as an
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Fig. 8.2 The real exchange rate (index~, 1980 = 100).
tremely low. The reorientation in the direction oftrade is also simple:
away from Europe, especially the UnitedK-ingdom, and toward Asia.
We conclude the review of trade patterns with a comment on the
importance ofthe United States in world trade. The share ofthe United
States in world trade has steadily declined over the post-World War
II period. In 1951-53 the United States share of world exports was
21%, in the early 1960s and 1970s respectively 17.2% and 13.5%. By
1981-82 the United States share of world exports had declined to
12.5%, despite the increase in the share of exports in United States
GNP. Germany and Japan are becoming near equals of the United
States in world trade as their share of exports approaches 10% in the
early 1980s.466 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
Table 8.4 The Composition of United States Trade
Exports Imports
Raw Manu- Raw Manu-
Years Materials Food factures Materials Food factures
1869-76 47 33 20 15 35 49
1877-86 33 47 20 20 36 44
1887-1906 32 40 28 28 31 41
1907-14 33 23 44 35 24 42
1915-19 17 29 54 41 27 32
1920-29 26 21 53 37 25 39
1930-39 28 12 62 30 28 41
1940-49 10 15 75 33 27 39
1950-69 13 15 72 21 23 58
1970-73 14 14 72 16 14 70
1974-77 16 15 69 35 10 55
1978-82 16 15 69 35 8 57
Source: Historical Statistics ofthe United States, part 2, series U-214 through U-224,
and Economic Report ofthe President, 1983.
Digression: The Smoot-Hawley Tariffand the Great Depression
The tariff changes shown in table 8.1 have been receiving increasing
attention as a macroeconomic phenomenon. In particular, the Smoot-
Hawley tariffof 1930 is argued to have played an important role in the
Great Depression. This view is certainly not found in the classic Fried-
man/Schwartz account of the depression:7 the Hawley-Smoot'Tariff
Act does not appear in the index; when it does appear, in a footnote
on page 342, it is only as a contributor to the gold inflow of late 1930;
and it is not featured in the discussion (359-63) of the international
character of the depression. Kindleberger gives the tariff act a sub-
stantial role, but on symbolic grounds: its signing represented United
States abdication of its responsibility to take charge of the world
economy.s
The modern interest in the Smoot-Hawley tariff traces mainly to
Meltzer's brief analysis.9 The argument "assigns a large role to the
7. Friedman and Schwartz 1963. Schwartz 1981 discusses the Smoot-Hawley tariff at
greater length. Although she regrets the tariff, she does not give it any greater role in
the propagation of the depression than do Friedman and Schwartz.
8. See Kindleberger 1973. See, too, League of Nations 1942. In the World Economic
Survey, the impact of the Smoot-Hawley tariff is described in terms of its effects on
protection: "From the middle of 1929, the steady deepening ofdepression, particularly
in the raw material producing countries, greatly reinforced the pressure for higher tariffs.
. . . The whole movement was undoubtedly accentuated both by the alarm and resent-
ment felt in many countries as the discussions of the new Hawley-Smoot tariff dragged
on in the United States Congress from May 1929 to June 1930, and by the real effects
of that tariff when it went into operation." There is no suggestion that the tariff is the
or even a chief cause of the depression.
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Hawley-Smoot tariffand subsequent tariffretaliation in explaining why
the 1929 recession did not follow the path of previous monetary con-
tractions but became the Great Depression" (460). The detailed ex-
planation gives considerable weight to the reductions in imports of
semifinished goods and exports ofagricultural goods following the tar-
iff, suggesting that the fact that bank failures in 1930 and 1931 were
concentrated in agricultural regions was in part a consequence of the
tariff. But it is important to note that Meltzer is mainly discussing the
onsetandrapid worseningofthe recession ratherthanthe responsibility
of macroeconomic policy for the depression's becoming great. There
is no implication that intelligent macroeconomic, and particularly mon-
etary, policy could not have prevented the disasters of 1932-33.
Intable 8.6 we present summarydataontradeand GNPin the periods
1918-23 and 1928-33. Each of these periods saw a major recession
and a major increase in tariffs. Indeed, the 1922 Fordney-McCumber
tariff increased tariff rates (calculated as the ratio of duties to either
total imports ordutiable imports) as much as the Smoot-Hawley tariff. 10
In light of the increases in tariffs shown in table 8.5, it is difficult to
accept Haberler's "skyscraper" description of Smoot-Hawley (1976,
8, 33). Fordney-McCumber would on the same scale qualify as a
"rocket" tariff. Further, as a matter of arithmetic, part of the blame
for the increase in tariffs between 1929 and 1933 goes to the drop in
price levels, since many tariffs were specific-thatis, specified in dollar
terms-rather than ad valorem.II
Fordney-McCumber was imposed in 1921-22 and was followed by
an increase in imports and a decrease in exports. The economic ex-
pansionwas responsiblefor the importincrease; the decreasein exports
was a deflationary impulse, outweighed by the start of the expansion
ofthe 1920s. A recession did begin in May 1923, but it was brief; 1924
real GNP was unchanged from that of1923, and imports fell very little.
Smoot-Hawley was also followed by a reduction in exports, but this
time there was a reduction in imports. These were primarily the result
ofthe recession. The decline in agricultural exports following Smoot-
Hawley was large, but so was the decline following Fordney-McCumber.
From either a Keynesian or a monetarist perspective, the tariff by
itself would have been an expansionary impulse in the absence of re-
10. Tariffs rose in 1921 as a result of "emergency" measures to aid agriculture and,
because tariffs were partly specific, as a result of the fall in prices.
11. Taussig 1964 presents the results ofa Tariff Commission calculation ofwhat tariff
revenues would have been in 1922 and 1930 for imports at the level of 1928. This index
thus holds constant the composition of imports and their prices: tariffs increase for all
categories, but the increases are small. The largest increase is from 19.9% to 33.6% for
agricultural products and provisions. Otherexamplesare chemicals, oils, and paintsfrom
29.22% to 31.4%, metals and manufactures from 33.7% to 35.0%, and manufactures of
cotton from 40.3% to 46.4%.469 The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Table 8.6 Tariffs and the Macroeconomy, 1918-23 and 1928-33
Years Real GNP Ratio of Ratio of Quantity Export Exports
(1918 = Duties Duties of Index of
100) to Total to Imports Crude
Imports Dutiable (index) Food
(%) Imports (quantity
(%) index)
(F3) (U211) (U212) (U237) (U225) (U229)
1918/1928 100/126 5.8/13.3 23.7/38.8 71/115 98/128 148/98
1919/1929 97/134 6.2/13.5 21.3/40.1 81/131 120/132 174/94
1920/1930 92/121 6.4/14.8 16.4/44.7 88/111 116/109 213/69
1921/1931 84/112 11.4/17.8 29.5/53.2 74/98 97/89 269/71
1922/1932 98/95 14.7/19.6 38.1/59.1 95/79 90/69 218/59
1923/1933 109/93 15.2/19.8 36.2/53.6 99/86 91/69 122/32
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States, 1970; series numbers indicated in
column headings.
taliation. In the Keynesian view, the reduction in imports diverts de-
mand to domestic goods; in the monetarist view the gold inflow in-
creases the domestic money stock if not sterilized. In the event, the
balance ofgoods and services fell after the imposition ofthe tariff. The
behavior ofnet exports suggests the emphasis on recession abroad and
retaliation, rather than the direct effect of the tariff, as a force con-
tributing to recession. Exports were 7% ofCiNP in 1929. Between 1929
and 1931, they fell by 1.5% of 1929 GNP. Attributing the entire fall to
the tariffretaliation and assuming a multiplier oftwo, real GNP would
have fallen 3% on this account. The fall in real GNP between 1929 and
1931 was over 15%, thus indicating that the tariffcould not have played
the major role in creating the recession by affecting the demand for
goods. Further, the 3% ofGNP calculation is surely a high estimate of
the effects of the tariff on exports.
In addition to the tariff United States net exports were, of course,
affected bythe extensivecompetitivedepreciationonthe partofforeign
countries. This consideration further reduces the significance to be
attached to the tariff as a cause precipitating the Great Depression.
On the monetary side, gold inflows increased at the end of 1930, but
1931 saw a reduction back to close to the 1929 proportion to NNP.12
These inflows were an inflationary force. To the extent that the tariffs,
via foreign retaliation, worked by creating distress in agricultural areas
and thereby setting offearly bank collapses, they had an adverse mon-
etaryeffect. But this only emphasizes the perversity ofthe Fed's bank-
closing policy. Further, it is not clear that a United States tariff on
agricultural imports that sheltered domestic producers from the col-
12. Data in Friedman and Schwartz 1963.470 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
lapse of world commodity prices would adversely affect those pro-
d~cers. Rather, itwas likely to have raisedtheirincomes (given inelastic
supply) above the free trade level.
We can summarize our argument briefly: Fordney-McCumber in-
creased tariffs substantially when the United States economy was in a
deep recession that was followed by a rapid recovery. Smoot-Hawley
increased tariffs at the start of a deep recession that was followed by
the Great Depression. Neither should receive prime credit or blame
for what followed: macroeconomic policies are far more significant. 13
8.1.2 Goods and Factor Price Links
The strict purchasing powerparity (PPP) theory ofthe exchange rate
holds that exchange rates move proportionately with national price
levels.14 PPP thus implies a one-for-one link between domestic and
foreign prices. Figure 8.3 and much otherevidence show that PPPdoes
not hold in any relevant sense. Relative national price levels, adjusted
through exchange rates, can and do move for lengthy periods. 15
Despitethe absence ofany strongrelationship between national price
levels, exchange rate and foreign price level changes do affect domestic
prices. Changes in the dollar prices of imports directly affect goods
and raw material input prices in the United States and thus affect the
prices offinal goods. The pressure ofinternational competition on the
prices of traded goods also affects domestic prices and the wage set-
tlements reached in the affected industries. Links ofthese types, to be
reviewed in the next section, change the dynamics ofinflation between
fixed and flexible exchange rate systems.
8.1.3 Asset Market Linkages and Capital Flows
The international integration of assets markets is in the 1980s an
accepted fact. Interest rates are linked internationally (adjusted for
anticipated depreciation), and capital flows are highly, perhaps exces-
sively, responsive to anticipated return differentials.
Asset market integration was ofcourse a well-known feature ofthe
pre-World War I and interwar world economies. The thrust ofcareful
empirical work is, however, to suggest that the linkages were less tight
than simple accounts of the gold standard imply. Morgenstern calcu-
13. It should be unnecessary to add that we are not advocating raising tariffs as a way
either into or out ofrecessions. Exchange rate changes that can be made to stickachieve
most of the same purposes.
14. For a careful review and analysis of the alternative versions of PPP, see Katseli-
Papaefstratiou 1979.
15. For discussion ofthe failure ofPPP, see Kravis and Lipsey 1983 and Frenkel 1981.
This is one ofthe key points at which the monetary theories ofthe exchange rate ofthe
early 1970s, which linked the domestic price level to the domestic money stock and then
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Fig. 8.3 International purchasing power comparisons: United States/
United Kingdom. Source: Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 769-
71 (wholesale prices).
lated correlation coefficients among short-term interest rates in Lon-
don, New York, Paris, and Berlin. For the period 1876-1914 the cor-
relation between the New York commercial paperrate and the London
private discount rate is only .45; for the period 1925-38 the correlation
is .93. 16 The correlation between monthly United Kingdom and United
States treasury bill rates for the flexible rate period, January 1974 to
16. Morgenstern 1959, 105. The data and sources are described on pages 119-23. The
meaning of these correlations is obscured by the fact that there are consistent and
noncoincident seasonals in the rates in different countries.472 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
November 1983, is .583,17 above the correlation for short-term rates
for the earlier gold standard period calculated by Morgenstern. During
the adjustable peg period, January 1964 to July 1971, the correlation
between monthly British and United States treasury bill rates was.794,
below the correlation for the interwar period calculated by Morgen-
stern. Although the Morgenstern data give the impression that short-
term interest rates had considerable latitude to move independently in
the pre-World War I period, the economic significance ofthe low cor-
relation depends on the absolute variability ofthe rates as well as their
correlation.
Interest rate differentials during the gold standard period were sub-
stantial. Morgenstern (1959, 335) calculates that the degree offlexibility
of the exchange rate implied by the gold points allowed an interest
differential on ninety-day bills of 3.73% between London and New
York. 18 In the period 1876-1914 the commercial paper rate in New
York was on average 2.17% higher than the private discount rate in
London. Risk and transaction costs of course permit differences in
mean rates ofreturnonapparently similarshort-termassets. 19 Butthere
was also considerable variability in the interest rate differential: the
standard deviation of the difference between the London and New
York rates was 1.21%. The differential exceeded 4% in more than 7%
ofthe months in the pre-World War I period, and in July 1893, during
a United States banking panic in which convertibility was suspended,
it was 9.63%. In the flexible exchange rate period, 1974 to 1983, the
standard deviation of the difference between treasury bill rates in the
United States and United Kingdom, 2.66%, was substantially larger
than in the early gold standard period.
The asset market linkages were closer in the interwar period and in
the fixed exchange rate period 1964-71. In the period 1925-38 the
mean London-New York differential was only 0.24% with a standard
deviation of 0.71%. The mean differential in the period 1964-71 was
1.33%, with the standard deviation of the difference, 0.72%, almost
identical to that for the interwar period.
There appear to be no reliable data on the size of short-term capital
flows during the gold standard periods, but the presumption is that they
were both large and an essential part ofthe mechanism that tied capital
markets together. The extent to which disturbances to United States
financial markets originated abroad rather than domestically has not
17. Calculations use International Financial Statistics data.
18. The gold points are given as $4.845 to $4.890, a range of0.92%. Incidentally, one
of Morgenstern's findings is that the gold points were on many occasions violated by
actual exchange rates.
19. In this connection it would be useful to calculate differentials between similar
assets in the same national market, as a benchmark for the international comparisons.473 The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
to our knowledge been documented, although there are discussions of
the national origins ofinternational financial crises.20 Morgenstern (1959,
548-49) shows the United States as more frequently the originatorthan
the recipient of(stock market) panics. Ofthe eleven first- and second-
order United States panics recorded for the period 1873-1932, the
United States transmits panic abroad in nine episodes and is the re-
cipient offoreign shocks in only two (1890 and 1907). On other occa-
sions, including 1914, foreign disturbances aretransmittedtothe United
States without causing a panic.
There are estimates ofaggregate capital flows, long- plus short-term,
that are consistent with the net export data presented in table 8.1
above.21 These show the United States as primarily an importer of
capital (averaging 0.8% ofNNP) overthe period until 1896; an exporter
of capital (average equal to 1.1% of NNP) over the next nine years;
once more an importer on a small scale until 1914; exporting capital
on a large scale during World War I (average of4.8% per year ofNNP
for the years 1914-19) and continuing to do so until 1933; reverting to
the role of importer until 1941; and thereafter exporting capital until
the most recent period.
8.1.4 Adjustment under the Gold Standard
We now briefly pull together the strands in this discussion of the
mechanisms linking the United States and foreign economies under the
gold standard, as background for our analysis in the next section of
the operation of the current flexible exchange rate system.
The earliest analysis ofthe operation ofthe gold standard, the Hume
price-specie flow mechanism, focused on the goods markets and on
movements in relative national price levels. These mechanisms should
be expected to produce slow adjustment to disturbances. Consider, for
example, the response of the economy to an upward shift in the do-
mestic demandfor money. Underthe price-specie flow mechanism, the
reduced demand for goods tends to reduc~e domestic prices and the
demand for imports. The current account goes into surplus, and gold
flows increase to satisfy the increase in moneydemand. The mechanism
can operate successfully through real balance effects on the demand
for imports even if PPP holds exactly. In the event the disturbance to
money demand is temporary, the process will have to be reversed when
the disturbance disappears.
Subsequent analysis described a system with more rapid adjustment
in which asset market linkages allowed capital flows in response to in-
20. Kindleberger 1978 and Morgenstern 1959, 541--55. Friedman and Schwartz 1963
typically regard American bankingpanics as ofdomestic origin. An exception is the 1890
crisis, in which the Baring failure receives mention (p. 104).
21. For the period 1869-1960, see Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 769-71.474 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
cipient interest rate movements, perhaps caused by active central bank
(orin the caseofthe United States, Treasury) intervention, to help equi-
librate the system.22 We continue with the example ofan upward shift in
the demand for money. The impact ofsuch a shift, which might be as-
sociated with a financial panic, is to increase domestic interest rates.
There is a capital inflow that equilibrates interest rates at home and abroad
and helps meet the increased demand for money. Ifthe demand shift is
temporary, there need be no major disruptions to the goods markets.
Thus in this case the capital markets promote more rapid adjustment to
a domestic disturbance. Ifthe demand shift is permanent, goods market
adjustments are needed to pay the interestonthe capital inflow.
This example is chosen as a case in which capitalflows ease domestic
adjustment. But of course from the viewpoint of the foreign country
the asset market linkages permit transmission of a disturbance that
would otherwise have been much slower in appearing. Further, as we
know from the downfall of the Bretton Woods system, international
capital flows in fixed exchange rate systems are not always regarded
as an unmitigated blessing. There are thus two questions: How did the
gold standard system survive during the period 1879-1914when capital
flows were not restricted? And did capital flows on average ease the
system's adjustment to disturbances?
Bloomfield argues that because there was no serious belief, even
during the silver agitation in the United States, that exchange rates
would change, capital flows under the pre-World War I gold standard,
though substantial and sensitive to interest rate movements, were not
destabilizing. He argues also that over the period, the discount rate
actions needed for external balance typically coincided with those needed
for internal stabilization, so that capital flows were on balance stabi-
lizing. The latter argument is vitiated by the well-known fact that even
during the heyday of the gold standard central banks did not conform
to the rules of the game and frequently sterilized gold flows. 23
The issues of the stabilizing or destabilizing roles and relative im-
portance ofthe goods market, price-specie flow, and asset market link-
ages, andofintervention, underthe gold standardhave notbeensettled,
22. Sayers 1958 describes the use ofbank rate in maintaining the international financial
system and includes references to earlier literature, including Clapham, Hawtrey, and
Viner. See also Bloomfield 1959, 41-46. Keynes 1930, chaps. 35-38, describes the
operation of the international gold standard and the role of central banks. Nurkse 1978
[1944], 98-105, also describes the adjustment mechanism.
23. Bloomfield 1959, 69, for the interwar period. It was suggested during discussion
that the behavior of central banks was different in the heyday of the gold standard.
Bloomfield 1959, 48-51, compares central bank behavior before 1914 with the post-
World War I behavior studied by Nurkse. His conclusion on the propensity to sterilize
is noteworthy (50): "By an amazing coincidence, these overall percentages [frequency
ofoffsetting] are virtually identical to those reached in the League study for the interwar
period.... One might even conclude, on the basis of this formula, that central banks
in general played the rules ofthe gamejust as badly before 1914 as they did thereafter!"475 The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
despite the extensive literature. Friedman and Schwartz emphasize the
importance of relative national price level adjustments in response to
money flows. 24 Nurkse (1978) argues that adjustment was typically
more rapid than the price-specie flow mechanism implies and credits
multiplier effects of the trade balance for part of the speedup. The
capital account tended to move procyclically, apparently offsetting the
stabilizing effects on the systemofthe money stock movements implied
by the anticyclical current account. Such capital flows might appear
to have been destabilizing from the viewpoint of the cycle, but that
would not be the case if they were accommodating temporary distur-
bances.25 And the issue of whether central bank sterilization had and
can have any real effects, and if so whether the effects are stabilizing,
is still alive.
8.2 Open Economy Macroeconomic Linkages
In this section we study the ties between United States macroeco-
nomic variables and the world economy and discuss how the openness
of the economy affects stabilization policy.. The analysis relies on the
theoretical model sketched in the appendix to this chapter, which em-
bodies the main channels and effects that are given emphasis in open
economy macroeconomics.26 As in the previous section, we start with
goods market linkages between the United States and othereconomies.
8.2.1 Goods Markets
The channels of transmission in the goods market are described by
equations (1) and (2) below. (For notation, and other arguments ofthe
demand function, see the appendix; time subscripts are omitted when
there is no risk of confusion.)
(1) Y = D(eP*/P,Yd,q,V,. ..) + NX(eP*/P,Yd,Y*d,V,V*, ...).
Equation (1), the goods market equilibrium condition, describes the
contributionofnetexportstoaggregatedemand. Thedemandfordomes-
tic goods is determined by real disposable income, the profitabilityofin-
vestment, the real exchangerate eP*/P, andreal wealth. Exportsdepend
ontherealexchangerate, andondomesticandforeign incomeandwealth.
24. Friedman and Schwartz 1963. Friedman and Schwartz calculate the PPP data
presented in figure 8.3 in examining the role of capital flows in moving relative goods
price levels.
25. Aghevli 1975 estimates an econometric model that includes both capital flows and
the influence of the current account on the money stock. He concludes that though
capital flows moved in a procyclicaldirection, thus offsettingthe effects on money supply
of the anticyclical current account, the current account effects dominate.
26. For recent discussions of open economy macroeconomics, see Branson 1980,
Branson and Buiter 1983, Dornbusch 1982a, 1983, Frenkel 1983, Henderson 1984, Mussa
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Equation (2) is the price equation:
(2) P = C(W,Pm,eP*,YIK).
In (2) the materials price term, Pm, changes as the prices ofimported
inputs change. The term in foreign prices, eP*, represents the effects
of foreign competitiveness on domestic prices. Equation (2) can be
thought of either as a markup equation or as the description of equi-
librium price determination in a competitive economy.
Several channels of transmission, which can be described in aggre-
gate supply and demand terms, emerge from equations (1) and (2).27
We confine ourselves for the moment to impact effects, thus taking into
account only short-run cyclical flexibility of prices and wages. The
channels are:
1. Most familiar, a rise in foreign income and spending raises the
demand for our goods, shifts the aggregate demand curve up, and thus
leads to an increase in output and home goods. An example is an
increase in foreign import demand as a result of expansion abroad.
This channel is ofcoursepresent underbothfixed andflexible exchange
rates. Such multipliers should be close in size to government spending
multipliers.28
2. A rise in import prices, induced by exchange depreciation or
increased foreign prices, shifts both aggregate demand and supply
curves. On the demand side, assuming a sufficiently large price elas-
ticity, there is a shift toward domestic goods and therefore a tendency
for output and prices to rise. On the supply side, the increase in com-
petitors' prices leads to an increase in home prices as domestic firms
increase their markup.29 Domestic prices certainly rise; we would ex-
pect output to increase.
The effects of an import price increase in practice depend on the
extent to which other endogenous and policy variables react to the
disturbance. In particular, it is important to know whether wages rise
in response to higher import prices and whether the monetary author-
ities accommodate the disturbance. The more wages rise with import
prices, and the more accommodating is money, the smaller the real
effects, and the larger the impact ofthe import price change on prices.
27. To derive the aggregate demand schedule, we assume away complications in the
model presented in the appendix that result from the multiplicity of assets and direct
links between exchange rates and asset markets.
28. Multiplier assumptions or estimates in large-scale trade models range between one
and two. For instance, the GECD international linkage model assumes a first-year gov-
ernment spending multiplier for the United States of 1.5. See OEeD Economic Studies
(1983). The EPA model has an implied first-year multiplier closer to one. See Amano,
Sadahiro, and Sasaki 1981,50. (Calculation based on the elasticity ofUnited StatesGNP
with respect to world imports in the EPA model.) However, Darby and Stockman find
very weak multiplier effects in their international model. See chapters 5-7 in Darby et
al. 1983.
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Results of simulations of econometric models, such as the GECD in-
terlink model, the Japanese Economic Planning Agency (EPA) model,
orthe Federal Reserve's multicountry model (MCM) will differ in their
assumptions about the nominal feedbacks resulting from an import
price increase, and conclusions about the effects of disturbances are
likely to differ.
Even leaving aside feedbacks from wages and money, there are ef-
fects ofimport price changes on aggregate demand. To the extent that
higher import prices raise the price level, without there being offsetting
reductions in domestic prices, the real money stock falls and the equi-
librium interest rate that clears the assets markets will rise. Higher
interest rates in tum imply a reduction in income and spending and
reduced aggregate demand and employment.
It is well known from the literature on trade equations30 that higher
import prices can in the short run lead to increased import spending
and a decline in net exports. The fall in net demand may imply a
reduction in demand for domestic goods or possibly a reduction in
saving.3l If increased import spending is financed by a reduction in
domestic saving, output will expand. Ifit has as its counterpartreduced
spending ondomestic goods, outputwill fall. Theoreticalanalyses show
that in this context it matters whether the disturbance is permanent or
transitory and whetherconsumers strongly prefer smooth consumption
streams and do not react to changes in the intertemporal terms oftrade.
The case most favorable to expansion of employment occurs if a dis-
turbance is believed to be temporary and consumption smoothing dom-
inates effects induced by real interest rates.
3. Increased materials prices imply increased costs and therefore
cause the aggregate supply curve to shift up. Butthere are also demand
side effects. Increased prices of imported materials imply a reduction
in real disposable income, since there is a reduction in value added at
a given level ofoutput. Domestic real disposable income falls because,
with real output unchanged, the higher real price of imported inter-
mediate products implies that real income available for domesticfactors
ofproduction is reduced. Aggregate demand therefore declines. Bruno
and Sachs (1985) have discussed the relative importance ofthe supply
and demand shifts and the resulting ambiguity for the net effects. There
is no question that output will decline, but the price level may rise or
fall. We assume the net effect is an increase in prices.
Materials prices are determined by supply and demand conditions
in the world market. Equation (3) describes the price of materials:
(3) Pm = v(Y, Y*, ... ,P,eP*).
30. See, for example, Stern et al. 1976.
31. See Laursen and Metzler 1950 and Razin and Svensson 1983.478 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
We assume v( ) is degree-one homogeneous in the domestic andforeign
price levels. Accordingly, we can rewrite (3) as
(3a) PmlP = v(Y, Y*, ... ,eP*IP).
Equations (3) and (3a) make the important point that exchange rate
disturbances unrelated to price level movements directly change com-
modity prices, both in dollars and in real (United States goods) terms.
In addition, of course, the real price of commodities is affected by
short- and long-run supply conditions, such as OPEC shocks.
4. The wealth and disposable income terms in equation (1) point to
a further channel of intemationallinkage. Changes in the world real
interest rate redistribute wealth and income internationally between
net creditors and net debtors. A rise in the real interest rate is an
intertemporal terms of trade change that benefits lenders, whose real
income rises, and hurts borrowers. At the same time, higher real in-
terest rates affect the valuation of existing assets. The values of real
capital and long-term debt decline, thereby reducing world wealth. The
net impact of these changes on aggregate demand for United States
goods is not obvious.
5. Wealth effects are also important in the context of persistent in-
ternational capital movements, for instance, arising from persistent
public sector deficits. With marginal spending patterns differing inter-
nationally, international redistributions ofwealth associated with cap-
ital account imbalances shift the pattern of world demand toward the
goods demanded by persistent lenders and away from those demanded
by persistent borrowers.32
8.2.2 Goods and Factor Price Linkages
Equations (2) and (3) show the external sector affecting domestic
prices directly, both through the effects of competitive import prices
on domestic markups and because import prices affect costs and thus
prices. Equation (2) also points to two indirect routes through which
the foreign sector affects domestic prices. Exposure to foreign com-
petition may affect wage settlements in industries substantially in-
volved in the international economy. Further, demand pressures from
abroad affect domestic prices through their impact on aggregate
demand.
32. Ideallywewouldwanttoquantifyeachofthefive channelsisolatedinthediscussion
above. However, since in practice they all operate at the same time, it is not easy to
separate them. Nor are we aware ofattempts to do so. Large-scale econometric models
typically explicitly embody some but not all of these channels; for instance, the EPA
model includes the multiplier, relative price, oil (equivalent to raw materials in our
discussion), and some wealth redistribution effects.479 The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Tables 8.7 to 8.9 report evidence on the impact ofthe external sector
on domestic inflation.33 For simplicity, and to avoid "overfitting," we
did not allow ourselves the use of dummy variables, nor did we ex-
periment much with lag lengths. The basic approach was to enter four
lagged values ofeach ofthe right-hand-side variables, butnotto restrict
the shape of the lag distribution. The coefficients on the wage change
variable were still increasing up to the fourth lag, so we extended that
lag length to six quarters. Contemporaneous values of the right-hand-
side variables are generally excluded; ordinary least squares regres-
sions suggested that the omission was serious only in regression (3)
(and 6), where a contemporaneous value of the rate of change of the
import price deflator is accordingly entered.34
The exchange rate variables in each case affect the inflation rate in
the expected direction, and for the most part significantly. Further, the
mean lag by which the exchange rate affects the inflation rate is always
shorter than that by which wage changes affect inflation.35 Equation
(1) gives the most direct relationship between the rate ofchange ofthe
33. Inclusion ofexternal variables in the Phillips curve, particularly import prices, has
a long tradition in open economies such as the Unite:d Kingdom. Without serious loss
of generality, we confined our search of the United States literature to the Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA). Foreign variables first appeared in a United States
Phillips curve in BPEA in Nordhaus 1972. Gordon 1973 reported on a reestimate of his
basic Phillips curve to include import prices. Interestingly, at that time import prices fed
through only slowly into domestic prices. Pierce and Enzler 1974 used the MPS model
to examine the effects offoreign disturbances. More recent empirical work that empha-
sizes external effects includes Gordon 1982.
34. Here are further details of and comments on our estimation or search procedure.
(a) We also experimented with adding the rate of change of the food price deflator,
omitting that variable because ofcollinearity with included variables. (b) The theoretical
specification ofthe markup equation in equation (2) includes the level ofoutput, but we
did not find output measures or the unemployment rate entering the regressions oftable
8.6 significantly. (c) Given the serial correlation, the endogeneity problem remains even
when the right-hand side contains only lagged variables. However, the problem is limited
because the serial correlation coefficient in most of the equations is low, and because
the lag coefficients in the most problematic case-that ofwages-typically peak only at
the third lag and are small at the first lag. Instrumental variable techniques are used in
equations (3), (6), and (7) to (9). We did not use the technique more extensively because
we were unable to persuade ourselves that the instruments we used-the monetary base,
full employment budget surplus,and military spending-were indeed exogenous, except
perhaps the last. In the cases where we used instrumental variable estimation, the
ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares estimates were quite similar.
35. This is not a reflection ofthe fact that we allow six lags for the wage variable and
only four for the exchange rate variables; when we allowed only four lags for wages,
the mean lag for this variable was still longer than that for exchange rates. The mean
lag is easy to interpret when all lag coefficients are ofthe same sign. In all but one case,
the coefficients on wage change are all positive. In the case of exchange rate changes,
though, either the first or the last lag coefficient is usually of a different sign (though
statistically insignificant) than the remaining coefficients. To avoid prejudicing the com-
parison of mean lags in favor of the exchange rate, we define the mean lag as
"i lail





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.481 The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
exchange rate and the inflation rate ofthe GNP deflator. According to
(1), a 10% change in the exchange rate directly changes the GNP de-
flator by only 0.6%. Even the largest effect, in regression (3), would
change the GNP deflator by only 1.3% in response to a 10% change in
import prices.36 The direct effects are not, however, the end of the
story, because we shall see in discussing table 8.8 that changes in the
exchange rate affect wages.
Comparing tables 8.7 and 8.8, we find a generally more powerful
effect of the exchange rate variables on consumer prices than on the
GNP deflator. The feedthrough to consumer price inflation is particu-
larly rapid in the case ofchanges ofimport prices. Even in this case,
though, the sum of the lag coefficients is only 0.14: a 10% change in
import prices changes the personal consumption deflator by 1.4%, with
most of the effect taking place contemporaneously.
Table 8.9 examines the impact of the exchange rate on the rate of
change ofwages.37 The results across the three equations show a con-
sistent effect of exchange rate movements on the rate of change of
manufacturing wages: a 10% rate of change of the exchange rate re-
duces the rate of wage change by between 1% and 1.5%. The mean
lags are, however, longer than in the price equations.
Taking the price and wage equations together, and at a given un-
employment rate, an appreciation ofthe currency affects the domestic
price level first through direct price effects and then through indirect
effects on wages. The direct effects are relatively quick, and they imply
that a 10% change in the exchange rate affects the price level within a
year by about 1%. There is then a second, slower-working, effect on
prices, working through wages, amounting to somewhat under 1% for
each 10% change in the exchange rate. We take the latter effect to
represent the impact offoreign competition on domestic wages.
The results of tables 8.7 to 8.9 thus support the argument that ex-
change rate changes affect the domestic price level and, during the
36. It is noticeable in both tables 8.7 and 8.8 that the coefficient on DEX is larger than
that on DWAX. The reason is probably that DEX, the rate ofchange ofthe real exchange
rate, is approximately equal to DWAX plus the foreign inflation rate minus the domestic
inflation rate. Since DEXenters negatively, it essentially includes positive lagged values
of the dependent variable. Its coefficient is therefore increased as a result of serial
correlation of the dependent variable. This interpretation is strengthened because the
coefficient of serial correlation in regression (2) is lower than that in (1), and similarly
in regressions (5) and (4).
37. In table 8.9 we use a simple adaptive expectationsformulation togenerate expected
inflation. We have also reestimated equation (7) using a three-period distributed lag on
the predicted inflation rates from equation (4) as the expectations variable. This change
reduces the coefficient on the unemployment rate and also reduces the coefficient on
the exchange rate to - .11 with a t-statistic of 2.43. The sum of the coefficients on the




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.484 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
adjustment period, the inflation rate.38 To the extent that monetary and
fiscal policy affects exchange rates, a flexible exchange rate regime
provides an extra channel of influence of policy on prices.
Table 8.10 summarizes the channels and lags with which a 10% real
depreciation translates into an increased consumption deflator. The
table highlights the fact that for given unemployment and expected
inflation rates, real depreciation exerts a significant impact on prices
and does so quite rapidly. The exchange rate must playa part in ex-
plaining United States inflation and in assessing the impact of policy
changes on the price level.
Figure 8.4 shows the actual inflation rate and also an estimate ofthe
inflation rate purged ofexchange rate effects. The latter series is con-
structed using the estimated coefficients of the real depreciation vari-
able in equations (5) and (8) in table 8.8 and 8.9 respectively. The
adjusted series is an estimate of what inflation would have been had
there been no effect of real depreciation on prices, either directly or
indirectly via wages. Figure 8.4 brings out the role of exchange rate
changes in the majorepisodes ofinflation accelerationanddeceleration:
1973-74, 1978-80, and 1981-83. In the acceleration periods exchange
depreciation increases inflation substantially, whereas in 1981-83 ex-
change appreciation strongly reinforces the deceleration of inflation.
This role ofexchange rates in the wage/price sector ofthe economy is
acceptedas obvious in small countries. Inthe United Statesitis already
part of macroeconometric models but is not yet accepted by mainline
macroeconomics.39
We now turn to the asset markets to explore further the effects of
monetary and fiscal policy on the exchange rate.
















Source: Tables 8.8 and 8.9, equations (5) and (8).
38. Our direct coefficients are typically smaller than those ofGordon 1982. This may
be a result ofour choosing not to use dummy variables to account for episodes such as
wage/price controls. Nonetheless, the sum of the direct and indirect effects is quite
smiliar to the coefficients obtained by Gordon, whose sample period was 1952 to 1980.


































































































































































































































































































































.486 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
8.2.3 Asset Markets
International capital mobility is a fact, but the appropriate specifi-
cation ofasset markets remains an open issue.4o There are three chief
questions. First, are domestic and foreign bonds perfect or imperfect
substitutes? Second, should stock markets be given a prominent role
in modeling international asset markets, or is the traditional money/
bonds model adequate for understanding the linkages? Third, does the
international redistribution ofwealth through the current account play
a significant role in the determination ofthe exchange rate and macro-
economic equilibrium? The answers to these questions help analyze
the implications of sustained fiscal deficits and of long-term current
account deficits-for instance, whether sustained deficits build up a
"dollar overhang" that will force exchange depreciation.
We have to preface this section by noting that empirical exchange
rate models perform poorly. Meese and Rogoff (1983) show that a
random walk model typically predicts exchange rates as well as stan-
dard structural models, even when the forecasts ofthe latter are based
on realized values offuture explanatory variables. The exchange rate
is like the stock market in that price movements are dominated by
unforecastable changes; accordingly, the extraction of the systematic
components of price movements is difficult in samples of the length
currently available. The absence ofdecisive empirical evidence forces
a greater reliance on theorizing, and on snippets of evidence rather
than a complete empirical model, in discussing exchange rate and in-
ternational economics.41
We start with the basic model in which foreign and domestic bonds
are perfect substitutes. The domestic nominal interest rate is therefore
equal to the foreign nominal rate plus the anticipatedrate ofdepreciation:
(4) i=i·+e.
(A A overa variable denotesits proportionalrateofchange.) Subtracting
national inflation rates from both sides gives the equivalent equation
in real interest rate form:
(5) r = r· + (e + p - p.).
Real interest rates can diverge internationally so long as the real ex-
change rate is changing, but in long-run equilibrium real interest rates
areequalized. The assumptions ofperfectasset substitutability, in com-
40. See Cumby and Obstfeld 1982, Frankel 1982, Melvin 1983, chap. 13, Obstfeld
1982, and Rogoff 1983.
41. We are not certain that the situation in open economy macroeconomics is signif-
icantly different from that for the closed economy. However, discussion of that issue
and its implications would take us too far afield.487 The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
bination with a specification of goods markets in which output deter-
mines demandandprices adjust slowly to excess demands and supplies,
leads to the following results:42 An increase in the money stock leads
under flexible rates to an immediate depreciation ofthe exchange rate.
The exchange rate initially overshoots its long-run equilibrium because
prices are sticky, real balances increase, and output expands while the
real and nominal interest rate fall. In the adjustment process following
the initial overshooting, inflation is accompanied by currency appre-
ciation as the real exchange rate returns to its long-run equilibrium
value.43
Monetary and fiscal policy thus work in good part through the real
exchange rate as well as the real interest rate channel. This was of
course the fundamental insight ofthe Mundell/Fleming model. As Mun-
dell (1964) noted: "It is important to notice too that budgetary policy,
like monetary policy, has a different role in a flexible exchange rate
system.... An increased budget deficit without monetary expansion
would raise interest rates, attract capital, appreciate the exchange rate,
and worsen the trade balance with little benefit to employment. With
sufficient monetary expansion a budget deficit would be unnecessary."
8.2.4 Monetary Policy
The results of any policy change are quite sensitive to policies fol-
lowed in the rest of the world. Specifically it matters whether the
authorities in the rest of the world stabilize interest rates, output, or
monetary aggregates. For instance, ifthey attempt to stabilize interest
rates in the context ofa foreign budget deficit, they create a monetary
expansion in attempting to fight rising domestic rates.44
The combination of rapidly clearing assets markets and prices that
adjust sluggishly implies a relation between real interest differentials
and real exchange rates. In the course of adjustment to a monetary
disturbance, the real exchange rate will adjust gradually to its long-run
equilibrium value, Ii. Let R = 10g(eP*/P) denote the logarithm of the
real exchange rate. Then the model implies that:45
(6) Rt = (1 - a)Rt - 1 + aRe
42. See Cardoso 1983, Dornbusch 1976, and Obstfeld and Stockman 1983.
43. Overshooting is not inevitable: if dynamics are such that output initially expands
sufficiently to raise the nominalinterestrate when the money stockis raised, theexchange
rate will not overshoot. The presumption is though that the nominal interest rate absorbs
most of the initial impact of the money shock.
44. A growing theoretical literature discusses the effects ofalternative policy reaction
functions and coordination mechanisms. See, for example, Canzoneri and Gray 1983
and Rogoff 1984. Empirical models too may include reaction functions; e.g., chaps.
5-7 in Darby et al. 1983.
45. See Dornbusch 1983.488 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
Combining the equation with the relation between real interest rates
in (5), r = r* + R, we obtain:
(7) Rt = R - b(r - r*), b = (1 - a)/a.
Equation (7) states that if our interest rates exceed those abroad,
then the real exchange rate will be below its long-run equilibrium value.
In other words, a positive real interest differential implies real appre-
ciation. The extent of such appreciation depends on the speed of ad-
justment in the economy. The term b is the mean lag, which under
rational expectations is a compound ofthe structural coefficients in the
model. If the mean lag is three years, then a three-percentage-point
real interest differential implies that the exchange rate deviates from
its long-run equilibrium by 9%. The asymmetry in adjustment speeds
between goods and assets markets thus establishes a link between tight
money and significant, transitory exchange rate overvaluation.46
The implications offlexible exchange rates for disinflation in a sticky
price world (the real world) are quite apparent: because tight monetary
policy works rapidly and strongly on the exchange rate, disinflation
can take place more rapidly. The Phillips curve becomes steeper under
flexible exchange rates.47
8.2.5 Fiscal Policy
The analysis offiscal policy under assumptions ofperfect asset sub-
stitutability is straightforward: a sustained fiscal expansion raises long-
run aggregate demand and therefore must bring about crowding out.
The crowding out occurs through two channels. The first is a real
appreciation in the expanding country owing to the relative increase
in demand for that country's goods. The other is an increase in the
world real interest rate. In a small country, crowding out will work
entirely through the real exchange rate, implying that the current ac-
count deteriorates by the full amount ofthe fiscal expansion.
What are the implications for the exchange rate? Given the nominal
money stock and full employment, higher real interest rates imply
reduced real money demand and hence a higher price level in each
country. For the real exchange rate to appreciate, we therefore require
a nominal appreciation ofthe expanding country.
This analysis ofthe effects ofa fiscal expansion is incomplete in that
it does not take into account complications arising from the debt fi-
nancing of the deficit in the short term and the ultimate need to raise
46. For an empirical implementation of this approach, see Driskill 1981. For further
review of the empirical evidence, see Hacche 1983.
47. See Dornbusch and Krugman 1976, Buiter and Miller 1982, and the discussion of
the Phillips curve above.489 The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
taxes to service the larger debt. Nor have we taken into consideration
the implications of sustained current account imbalances that redis-
tribute wealth away from the expanding country. What are the impli-
cations ofthese additional channels?
As noted above, the redistribution of wealth via current account
imbalances will affect the goods markets because marginal spending
patterns differ. Therefore demand for the expanding country's goods
would decline over time, owing to redistribution; the need for real
appreciation is therefore dampened. But this effect is offset to some
extent by the stimulus due to deficit finance. 48
The portfolio effects associated with debtfinance remain an unsettled
area ofresearch. Once we depart from the assumption ofperfect asset
substitutability, we must reckon with the asset market implications of
debt finance. These effects occur through two channels. First, there is
a direct effect of debt finance on the relative supplies of assets. Debt
finance implies that the relative supply ofthe expanding country's debt
rises. Asset holders have to be compensated to hold an increasing
fraction of their wealth in the form of the expanding country's debt
either through an increased nominal interest differential or through
anticipated appreciation. But it is also possible that a once and for all
depreciation of the expanding country reduces the value of its debts
in terms of foreign exchange, thus reducing the portfolio share and
eliminating the need for higher interest rates or appreciation.49
The discussion is clarified in equation (8), where we present the
internationalinterestrate relation, taking into account the risk premium
that results from imperfect asset substitution.50 The equation states
that the nominal interest differential equals the expected rate of de-
preciationplus a risk premium, K, which depends onthe relative supply
of domestic debt relative to world wealth and on the domestic share
in world wealth.
(8) i = i* + e + K(B/eV*,V/eV*), K 1 > O,K2 < 0
whereV is world wealth measured in terms offoreign exchange. Equa-
tion (8) shows that the exchange rate or the rate ofdepreciation must
adjust to maintain portfolio balance in the face ofa rise in the domestic
bond supply, given interest rates. The possibility of exchange depre-
48. Blanchard 1983 has shown that fiscal expansion will have additional expansionary
effects associated with debt issue when future taxes are discounted at more than market
rates. This effect continues, though dampened, in the open economy. Unless the entire
debt finance translates into current account deficits so that the rest ofthe world acquires
all the debt, there will be some net expansion of demand from debt creation.
49. Empirical work has not clearly established that foreign and domestic bonds are
imperfect substitutes. See Frankel 1982, 1983.
50. See Dornbusch 1982b for a derivation and references to the extensive literature.490 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
ciation to clear asset markets runs counterto the analysis for the goods
markets, where crowding out leads us to expect an appreciation. What
then will happen? As the discussion here already makes clear, this is
not an area where we expect unambiguous results.
Research on the implications ofdebt finance has used simulation to
attempt to assess the relative importance ofportfolio effects-relative
asset supplies and risk premiums-andaggregate demand effects.51 The
quantitative finding that emerges is that in the long run a fiscal expan-
sion will lead to depreciation, rather than appreciation, ifthe portfolio
effects are relatively important. Specifically, ifdebt issue forces a large
increase in our interest rates to maintain portfolio balance, and if de-
mand reacts to the interest rate increase by more than full crowding
out, then a real depreciation is required to restore goods market equi-
librium. If, by contrast, assets are highly substitutable, then risk pre-
miums do not play a significant role, and as a result the long run
crowding out must take place via real appreciation.
In concluding the discussion ofthe portfolio effects offiscal policy,
we note that these effects are entirely due to the assumption that budget
deficits are financed by issuing bonds denominated in terms of the
expandingcountry's currency. The risk premiumeffects canbe avoided
by financing deficits in a way that keeps the currency composition of
world outside assets unchanged. For instance, in the present circum-
stances, the United States would finance part ofthe deficit in yen and
deutsche mark bonds. We a!so note that our analysis has not taken
into account effects offiscal policy on the stock market. These effects
have not been addressed in the literature but may well turn out to be
more important than the questions associated with the currency de-
nomination of bonds.
8.2.6 Interdependence
Our discussion so far has taken as given the key foreign variables-
interest rates, income, prices-that influence domestic macroeco-
nomic equilibrium via trade in goods and assets. But of course these
variables are determined jointly with those at home, and, to compli-
cate matters, policy interdependence comes to play a role. Foreign
monetary and fiscal policies respond to disturbances at horne as for-
eign policymakers attempt to influence the movements of exchange
rates, interest rates, prices, and output in a manner that optimizes
their macroeconomic policy objectives. This interdependence of course
influences our conclusions about the effects of monetary and fiscal
policies. Tight money, for example, may not lead to appreciation if
foreign governments are inflation sensitive and therefore contract their
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own money stocks in tandem with our contraction to avoid currency
depreciation. In other instances "synchronized expansion" agreed
upon by the governments of the major countries provides the "loco-
motive" for world recovery.
In view of this interdependence it is interesting to ask how closely
monetary growth and discretionary fiscal policy are correlated be-
tween countries. Table 8.11 provides information on this question for
the growth rates ofM1 and for the discretionary fiscal policy changes.
It is interesting that there is no definite change in the money growth
correlations between the fixed and flexible exchange rate periods. The
qualification to that statement is the interesting shift to a negative
correlation for Japan under flexible rates. I~or fiscal policy, taking the
whole period for which data are available, the correlation is relatively
low. Moreover, the correlation between fiscal policy changes in the
United States and a simple average of other countries in table 8.11 is
only .08.
Econometric modeling of the world macroeconomy remains at an
experimental stage, but such models do exist at the Federal Reserve
Board, the OECD, and the Japanese Economic Planning Agency. Com-
parisons ofthe policy multipliers from these models is rendered difficult
by differing assumptions about monetary and fiscal accommodation to
shocks and by differences in the simulation periods. But even so it is
worthwhile to compare some results. Table 8.12 shows the multipliers
of the Federal Reserve's MCM model and the EPA's world economic
model (WEM) for a United States fiscal expansion under flexible ex-
change rates.
In looking at the effects of United States policies on the foreign
countries, we note that there are spillover effects under flexible ex-
change rates both on output and on prices. But table 8.12 also reveals
that these effects are not very sizable as long as the disturbance remains
small.
Table 8.11 Correlation of Money Growth and Fiscal Policy of Major
Countries with Those of the United States
Germany Japan United Kingdom
Annual Ml growth
1959-72 .16 .07 .50
1974-82 .27 -- .27 .20
Fiscal policy change
1971-82 .11 .29 - .14
Source: IMF and OEeD Occasional Studies, June 1978, p. 19, and Economic Outlook,
December 1983, p. 34.
Note: For definition of discretionary fiscal policy change, see the sources.492 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
Table 8.12






Fiscal Multipliers from Two World Macro Models (percentage
increase in real GDP in the first two years)
United States Japan Germany
1.5 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5
2.02 2.01 0.17 0.56 0.17 0.59
-0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
0.57 1.38 0.11 0.36 0.04 0.20
Source: See note 55.
Note: The table shows the percentage increase in real GDPand in consumerprices owing
to a sustained increase in United States real government spending equal to 1% of GDP
for the first two years.
aFederal Reserve Board multicountry model.
bJapanese Economic Planning Agency world economic model.
8.3 Summary
The standard macroeconomic paradigm remains the IS-LM model
augmented with a Phillips curve.52 In this paperwe have shown how the
model must, for the case ofthe United States economy, be amended to
take accountofinternationaleffects and interactions. Whatconclusions
emerge?
The only key structural equation that goes unamended is the money
demand equation. Even here foreign variables are often proposed, though
not persuasively.53 In the goods and assets markets, foreign prices,
foreign activity, and foreign asset yields appear as important deter-
minantsofdomestic activity, prices, and interestrates. The quantitative
magnitude and the stability of these relations remains a topic of re-
search, but their existence and their importance to an understanding
of the United States macroeconomy are beyond question.
International interactions exert an important effect on the way mon-
etary and fiscal policies operate. The exchange rate system determines
theextenttowhichasynchronizedpolicies arepossible andthe channels
through which they exert their effects on the economy. The Mundell!
Fleming model of twenty years ago introduced these ideas, and they
remain valid today. For the United States economy, policy limitations
became apparentin the late 1960s when capital outflows ona large scale
signaled that even a large country could not set the tone for the world
economy. But under flexible exchange rates these interdependence ef-
fects have become much more dramatic. They immediately affect the
52. See BoardofGovernors ofthe Federal Reserve 1983, Amano, Sadahiro, and Sasaki
1981, and Yoshitomi 1984. For further references see, too, Larsen et al. 1983.
53. See, for example, McKinnon 1982.493 The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
key trade-off-the Phillips curve. Theory suggests and empirical evi-
dence supports the notion that under flexible rates the Phillips curve is
much steeper. A tight money policy leads to appreciation and thus al-
lows rapid disinflation. The traditional idea, appropriate to fixed rates,
is that crowding out takes place chiefly via higher interest rates' de-
pressing interest-sensitive components of spending, particularly hous-
ing. Under flexible rates the crowding out takes place also at another
margin, reduced net exports owing to appreciation.
Thinking on fiscal policy, too, must be modified. Fiscal expansion via
its impact on interest rates induces currency appreciation, at least in
the short run. Therefore fiscal expansion is less inflationary than the
closed-economy Phillips curve suggests, but it also involves more
crowding out. This is because net exports decline under the impact of
appreciation.
Several unsettled areas of research require attention. One is to de-
termine the importance ofrelative asset supplies for risk premiums and
hencefor long-runinterestdifferentials, equilibriumrealexchangerates,
orboth. The literature as yetgives no guidance to these issues. To make
the point concretely, we do not have in domestic macroeconomics any
empiricalevidencethatthematurityofthedebtaffectsthetermstructure
ofinterest rates. Long-term and short-term debt, for macroeconomics,
are much the same. Is this also true when w(~ ask ifitmakes a difference
whetherourUnited States deficits are financed in deutsche mark orUnited
States dollarbonds? Ifthe answeris affirmative, an entire popularrange
of ideas about the budget and exchange rates becomes irrelevant.
The second issue on which we know very little, indeed even less, is
the open economy role of the stock market. If asset markets are im-
portant via their impact on exchange rates and hence on aggregate
demand and prices, then surely the stock market must take a partic-
ularly important place because it is forward looking and because ofits
size relative to other asset markets.
The third issue, closely linked to the previous point, concerns the
open economy linkages to investment. What is the impact of real ex-
change rates on investment spending, and how important are long swings
in real exchange rates in affecting investment and hence productivity
growth and employment? This question connects, ofcourse, with the
crowding-out issue raised above. The current view expressed in policy
discussions is that there is less crowding out under flexible than under
fixed exchange rates. But perhaps, taking into account the open econ-
omy channels, we get as much crowding out of investment, but with
real appreciation rather than increased real interest rates as the chan-
nels and with manufacturing rather than housing as the affected sector.
Such effects, if they do exist, would have significant longer-run impli-
cations for the performance ofthe economy.494 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
Appendix
In this appendix we set out and briefly analyze a simple model that
includes the three chief links between the domestic and international
economies: the demand for goods, corresponding to Keynesian mul-
tiplier analysis; asset market linkages, emphasis on which at one time
led to the claim that exchange rates are determined in the assets mar-
kets; and the supply side, which has received emphasis in the recent
disinflation. The model guides our discussions in the text ofthe effects
of exchange rate changes and foreign shocks.
The Model
The Assets Markets
There are four assets: domestic money, domestic bonds, foreign bonds,
and capital. Domestic money is held entirely by domestic residents.
Domestic bonds and capital may be held by foreigners as well; foreign
bonds may be held by domestic residents.
Equilibrium conditions in the markets for domestic assets are:
(AI) M




= H(Yt , 'Yf, I1t , 'Yf, 'Yr, Vt , V;, HI < 0, Hz > 0,
Pt H 3 ~ 0, H4 < 0,
H 5 < 0, H 6 > 0, H 7 > 0.
(A4)
(A3) qtKt = 1(Yt, "If, lIt, "If, Vt, V;), 11 ~ 0, 12 < 0,
13 ~ 0,14 > 0,
15 < 0, 16 > 0, 17 > 0.
Symbols are defined in table 8.A.I. The expected real returns on do-
mestic bonds, capital (equity), and foreign bonds are given by:
(l + 'Yf) = (l + Rn(p~~)·
(A5)
(A6) (
etPt ) (1 + "If) = (1 + Rf)t P .
et+l t+l
The presubscript t indicates the expectation formed on the basis of













Nominal return on domestic bonds
Stock of domestic bonds
Expected real return on domestic bonds
Expected inflation rate
Expected real return on domestic equity
Wealth of domestic residents
Foreign wealth
Relative price of an equity claim on capital
Exchange rate
Holdings offoreign bonds by domestic residents





Domestic price of material inputs
Nominal wage
Rate of depreciation of capital
Real taxes minus transfers, exclusive of interest payments on government
debt
not only ofexpected real returns but also of TIH the expected inflation
rate, we use the first-order approximation:
(A4')
1
(1 + Rf) = (1 + ~f) --I--
t(::~)
= (l + )If) tP;:1
A similar approximation applies for the return on foreign bonds.
Real domestic wealth, Vt , consists of holdings of the four assets by
domestic residents:
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Because foreign residents may hold both domestic bonds and domestic
equity, the amounts ofthese assets held by domestic residents are not
usually equal to the outstanding stocks.
The assumption in (AI) is that money is held for transactions pur-
poses, at an opportunity costequal to the return on bonds.54 The assets
are assumed to be gross substitutes. Demand functions by domestic
residents have the same general forms as LC( ), H( ), and J( ) but are
not dependent on foreign wealth, V;. In addition, the demand by do-
mestic residents for foreign bonds is:
(A8) Gl ~ 0, G2 < 0, G3 ~ 0,
G4 < 0, G5 > 0, G6 > 0.
(AIO)
The Goods Market
We start by specifying the demand for domestic output.
(A9) Yt = V(e:,;, Y1, Gt, Vt> qt)
+ NX(e:,;, Y1, Yr, Vt (q,q*,PmIP»), Vi > 0, i = I,?,
NXl > 0, NX2 < 0, NX 3 > 0, NX4 < 0.
Prices are based on costs and the level ofoutput relative to capacity:
Pt = C(Wt, Pr;z, etP;, Y/Kt),
Cl > 0, C2 > 0, C3 > 0, C4 ~ 0.
The function (AIO) permits an interpretation as a supply function with
output on increasing function ofthe price level and a decreasing func-
tion ofthe wage, materials prices, and the prices ofimported inputs.55
Wages
Wages are predetermined, based on the level of output (and thus
employment) and expected price level:
(All) (
t-lPt) Wt = 1\1 (YIK)t-h t-l(YIK)t> ---p; , Wt- 1 ,
\fIl > 0, \fI2 > 0, \fI3 > 0, \fI4 > 0.
54. The return Rf should therefore be thought ofas applying to a short-term asset; it
would be desirable to include term-structure relations in an extended version of the
model.
55. We have not included cost of capital measure in (AIO), though the rental rate on
capital and inventory holding costs do provide a supply-side channel for interest rates
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Accumulation Equations
The wage equationprovides thefirst explicitdynamic equation. Asset




(Mt+1 + Bt+1 - M t - Bt) = PlGt - Tt) + (1 + R1j-l)Bt.
(1 + R{_I)etB;f - (1 + Rf-l)(Bt - B1)
- (1 + F K( ))qlKt - K1) + Ptl\lXt
= etB;~1 - (Bt+1 - B1+1) - qt(Kt+1 - K1+1)·
(AI2) is the capital accumulation equation, (AI3) the government bud-
get constraint, where it is implicitly assumed that all debt is one~period,
and (AI4) is the balance of payments constraint.
The openness of the economy is reflected in the asset market
equilibrium conditions, the goods market~, and the asset accumu-
lation equations. In the assets markets, movements in foreign in-
terest rates, or in foreign wealth, affect United States rates of return
and asset prices: foreign influences appear on both the demand and
supply sides in the goods market; on the supply side, external
disturbances may affect both the prices of material inputs and,
directly, the costs of imported inputs. Equation (AI4) describes the
link between the current account and net ownership of foreign
assets.
We now analyze the short- and long-run equilibriums of the model,
emphasizing open-economy aspects, before turning to the dynamics of
adjustment.
Short-Run Equilibrium




R1j = R (Xt)
qt = q(Xt)
e'!Pt = e(Xt),
Several ofthe variables in X t will themselves be determined in the full
equilibrium of the model. The asset holdings, B1, K1, B;d are to be
understood as beginning of period stocks.(AI6)
q
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Thepropertiesofthefunctions in (AI5) areimpliedbytheequilibrium
conditions (AI)-(A3). (AI) directly implies
B _ (Mt ) Rt - R P
t
' Yt ,
We are thus making the strong assumption that money market condi-
tions alone determine the short-term interest rate. Inclusion ofwealth
in the demand function for money would modify this latter conclusion
without affecting the signs of the derivatives indicated in (A16).
The properties ofthe q( ) and e( ) functions are obtained using (A2)
and (A3). Suppose there is an increase in the expected real return on
foreign bonds, Yr, with other variables in X t held fixed. (Thus both
the nominal and real returns on foreign bonds increase.) Figure 8.A.I
shows asset market equilibrium loci, JJ representing capital market
equilibrium and HH bond market equilibrium. The JJ curve is posi-
tively sloped because an increase in q creates an excess supply of




Effects of an increase in the foreign interest rate.
HH
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the real exchange rate (depreciation). The HH curve slopes down
because an increase in q creates excess demand for bonds through
both rate of return and wealth effects, which is offset by the wealth
effect of an appreciation.
An increase in the foreign interest rate creates an excess supply of
both bonds and capital in the United States. The curves shift as shown
in figure 8.A.I to maintain asset market equilibrium. The real exchange
rate unambiguously rises-the currency depreciates. The effects on q
depend on the relative substitutability of domestic bonds and capital
for foreign bonds. If the substitution is mainly between domestic and
foreign bonds, then q will rise. This occurs because with the domestic
interest rate given, the increase in elPthat equilibrates the bond market
is large and creates excess demand in the capital market. Ifsubstitution
between foreign bonds and domestic real assets is high, a rise in
interest rates abroad will reduce United States stock values. An in-
crease in the expected rate of depreciation of the dollar (i.e., a rise
in tet+l1et) will have the same effects on the exchange rate and q as
a change in the foreign interest rate.
An open market purchase, in figure 8.i\.2, reduces the domestic
interest rate, creating an excess demand for capital and-it can be
shown-an excess supply ofbonds. Equity prices rise, and the effects
on the exchange rate are ambiguous. The more substitutable are bonds
and capital, the more likely is it that the open market purchase causes
the currency to depreciate.
The properties of the functions q( ) and e( ) in (AI5), which can be
derived using similar analysis, are:
(AI?) ~ > O.aq > O.aq < O.aq < O.aq ? ~
aM 'aB 'aK 'ap 'aY' P ,
a~
Pt
aq aq aq ae ae ae
-- ~0·-- >0- ~ 0-- >0- >0-




I. The wage equations in table 8.5 use the following data:
W: hourly earnings ofproduction workers, total private nonfarm
Wman: hourly earnings of production workers in manufacturing









Fig.8.A.2 Effects of an open market purchase.
Wage inflation is measured by the quarter-to-quarter change at an
annual rate in each equation. The unemployment variables in the three
equations are respectively the unemployment rate of wage and salary
workers in manufacturing, the unemployment rate ofwage and salary
workers in finance and services, and the economywide unemployment
rate of married men.
Expinf: expected inflation is measured by a geometrically distributed
lag on the four-quarter inflation rate of the consumption expenditure
deflator with a .15 decay factor so that expinf = .1510g(P(-1)/P(-5»
+ .85*expinf(- 1).
Delex denotes the twelve-quarter change in the real exchange rate.
The real exchange rate variable is the relative value added deflator
in manufacturing reported in the International Monetary Fund Inter-
national Financial Statistics. With R the real exchange rate, Delex
= 100*log(R/R(- 12».
2. The inflation equation in table 8.4 shows as independent variable
the quarter-to-quarter change, at an annual rate, of the fixed-weight501 The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
GNP deflator. The unemployment rate is that of married men. Real
exchange depreciation is defined as above. l'he wage inflation variable
is the four-quarter change in hourly compensation in the private non-
farm economy, Winf = 100*log(Wage/Wage(-4)). The dummy vari-
able in the regression assumes a value of 0 for 1965-72 and 1 for
1973:1 to 1983:2.
3. The inflation equationfor manufacturing uses as wage inflation the
quarter-to-quarter change, at annual rates, of hourly compensation in
manufacturing. Theunemployment rate is thatofwage and salary work-
ersin manufacturing. Thereal depreciation variable is defined as above.
Comment Stanley W. Black
The paperby Dornbusch and Fischershould perhaps be retitled "Link-
ages of the United States Economy to the Rest of the World," since
that is its principal topic and theme. As such, it is a highly useful
component of a domestically oriented volume such as this one.
The paper falls into two parts, of which the first examines whether
the major linkages have changed in the postwar period or more recent
floating exchange rate periods, as compared with prewar experience,
using descriptive statistics. The second part, together with the appen-
dix, provides an analytical model of the linkages and some estimates
of price/wage linkages in the period 1962-83.
To my taste this organization of data first, theory second leaves
something to be desired. To a novice in international economics, it
might appeara bit like some ofmy ten-year-old daughter's cake-making
operations: first we get out the ingredients, then we look for a recipe
to combine them! Of course Dornbusch and Fischer are expert chefs,
so they know which ingredients are called for. But the unwary reader
might find it useful to peruse part 2 before reading part 1.
The paper begins with a perhaps surprising fact: business cycles in
four major countries were more closely in phase during the gold stan-
dard era than in either the interwar or the postwar period. This result
depends on comparing Morgenstern's measures of harmonization of
"classical" business cycles in the prewar periods with Klein and
Moore's measure of postwar "growth cyclc~s," a comparison that in-
volves the use of slightly different concepts.
Dornbusch and Fischer next turn to discussion of trade linkages,
showing in table 8.1 that on average the United States economy has
Stanley w. Black is a professor in the Department ofEconomics, University ofNorth
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always been relatively closed, though it reached an autarchic extreme
in the 1930s. Use ofthe net service balance here is possibly misleading
because of the growth in the share of services in total trade flows.
However, as the authors stress, the United States economy is open at
the margin in the sense that trade flows, though small, fluctuate as
much as other components ofGNP. Figure 8.2 suggests appropriately
that changes in relative prices as reflected in the real exchange rate
may have led to the increased importance oftraded goods in the econ-
omy in the 1970s, as shown in table 8.1.
It is interesting that Dornbusch and Fischer's discussion of trade
flows looks at trade in relation to income and relative prices but not,
with the exception of their treatment of the gold standard period, in
relation to monetary flows. I take this as a reflection of the fact that
the monetary approach to the balance ofpayments is not particularly
relevant to explaining the composition ofthe United States balance of
payments, especially since reserve flows have usually been an unim-
portant component of changes in the money supply.
The digression on the Smoot-Hawley tariff argues that a tariff that
is not subject to retaliation should be expansionary on both Keynesian
and monetarist grounds. This argument would be more convincing if
the authors could assure us that retaliation did not occur. This point
is particularly worrisome in the light of current agitation to pass leg-
islation requiring a minimum domestic content for automobiles sold in
the United States.
Moving on to the discussion of asset market linkages, we note an
apparent paradox in the findings: (a) the correlation between United
States and United Kingdom monthly treasury bill rates is higher in the
floating rate period 1974-83 than during the gold standard period 1876-
1914; (b) the standard deviation ofinterest rate differentials was lower
during the gold standard period than during the floating rate period.
The paradox is probably due to the inflation premium in interest rates
during 1974-83, which exaggerates the correlation coefficient. It might
well disappear ifreal interest rates were compared rather than nominal
rates.
Part 2 of the paper begins with a model of aggregate supply and
demand, spelled out more explicitly in the appendix and familiar from
the authors' textbook and many otherplaces cited in a footnote. While
I have no serious problems with this rather Keynesian model, Anna
Schwartz and others may find things to argue with. I take it the main
purpose is to describe the linkages, which is certainly accomplished.
Tables 8.7 to 8.9 offer estimates ofprice and wage linkages, covering
1962-83, which includes periods ofboth pegged and flexible exchange
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proper to enter the exchange rate as a predetermined variable when
the exchange rate is floating? Did wage and price controls affect the
relationship? Was it unchanged over such a long period? Table 8.10
estimates that a 10% depreciation of the dollar would eventually lead
to a 2% rise in prices, significantly above the usual estimate of 1.5%.
One should note that the larger effect of the exchange rate on the
personal consumption deflator than on the GNP deflator is due to the
exclusion of imports from domestic value added (i.e., GNP).
Part 2's discussion ofasset markets seems disjointed, presenting the
case of perfect substitutability in the text and the case of imperfect
substitutability in the appendix. As the authors note, the empiri~al
literature has in a sense rejected both cases, since random walk models
forecast about as well as any standard structural model. Since the text
maintains the assumptionofperfect substitutability down to the section
on fiscal policy, it would be helpful to the reader to understand that
this implies risk-neutral investors.
The discussion ofmonetary and fiscal policy notes the role ofmove-
ments in the real exchange rate as a key element in the transmission
process in an open economy model. The familiar Dornbusch result that
the nominal exchange rate overshoots its equilibrium value in a world
ofhigh asset substitutability is explained in the context oftight money
leading to a temporarily overvalued exchange rate. The benefits to
inflation control can be described as a steeper Phillips curve, but it
should be noted that the gain to inflation control is only temporary,
because the overvaluation is necessary.
Introduction of imperfect substitutability in the discussion of mon-
etary policy would allow treatment of different monetary policy in-
struments such an open market operations or exchange market inter-
vention, which cannot be distinguished in the perfect substitutes case.
Recent work by Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Loopesko (1983) re-
jects the perfect substitutes model when combined with the assumption
of efficient markets.
The alternative approach leads to a model of a time-varying risk
premium, as shown in the authors' equation (8). Among others, Dorn-
busch (1982b) and Black (1985) have decomposed the risk premium
into factors involving a coefficient of risk aversion, the conditional
variance of the exchange rate, and the relative supply offoreign cur-
rency assets. A substantial amount of current work is aimed at iden-
tifying causes oftime-varying risk premiums.
This paper closes with some rather mystifying comments on the
portfolio effects offiscal policy. The authors state that fiscal expansion
will lead to exchange rate depreciation if "portfolio effects are impor-
tant." This presumably refers to imperfect substitutability and would504 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
be no surprise in the Mundell/Fleming model with low capital mobility.
Finally, they suggest that the effects offiscal policy on the stock market
may be of major importance.
There are several issues affecting monetary and fiscal policy that do
not make it into part 2 of the paper and that ought to be considered
by business cycle theorists. These include Meade's (1951) analysis of
the role ofinternal and external balance targets on the formulation of
monetary and fiscal policy and more recent discussion by Sachs (1980)
and others of the influence of real versus nominal wage stickiness on
the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy. But the authors have
provided a service to readers of this volume by discussing the major
linkages between open economies.
Comment Anna J. Schwartz
Let me begin by noting an error of omission and one of commission
that I find in the paper. The errorofomission is the absence ofa money
supply function. Dornbusch and Fischer state that if monetary au-
thorities "attempt to stabilize interest rates in the context ofa foreign
budget deficit, they create a monetary expansion in attempting to fight
rising domestic interest rates." That is the only reference to a distur-
bance that may arise on the supply ofmoney side. Again, in summing
up, they refer to the ways an IS-LM model must be modified to take
account of international effects and interactions. They state that the
only key structuralequationthatgoes unamended is the money demand
equation. Ifthe money demand equation is the only key equation that
goes unamended, why is there no amended money supply equation in
the event authorities react to foreign influences in setting the target for
the instrument they use in determining the money stock growth rate?
The authors may respond that it is the United States economy only
that they are examining, and United States monetary authorities do
not react to foreign influences. That certainly has not been true ofthe
whole period since 1962 that the second part ofthe paper focuses on.
In any event the subject offoreign influences on the supply of money
deserves discussion.
The error ofcommission I find in the paper is the assessment ofthe
role ofthe exchange rate. Dornbusch and Fischerstate, "Theexchange
rate must playa part in explaining United States inflation and in as-
sessing the impact ofpolicy changes on the price leveL" The exchange
rate does not "explain" inflation. It is a necessary adjustment to in-
Anna J. Schwartz is a research associate ofthe National Bureau ofEconomic Research.505 The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
ftation that originates in monetary actions. 1 shall take up this issue at
a subsequent point. My comments deal with selected aspects of the
paper.
Trends and Cycles
Although the first part of the paper covers trends and cycles in the
external linkages, by NBER traditional standards, there is not much
on cycles. The following points occur to me.
1. The measure of openness of the United States economy in table
8.1, shown in the column of tariff proceeds as a percentage of total
imports ofdutiable and nondutiable goods, is dubious, as the authors
indicate, but not only because a tariff that excludes all imports would
have no weight in an index of this type. More important, in recent
years it is not the tariff but quantitative trade restraints that are the
most important barriers to openness. How to express the quantitative
effect of such restraints when there is no measure of the volume of
trade that does not take place is an intractable problem.
With respect to the exchange rate regime, fixed exchange rates under
the pre-World War I gold standard implied openness to foreign dis-
turbances. It was the rejection ofthis condition and the consequences
for domestic economic activity that led in the interwar period to the
conceptions that dominated the creation ofthe Bretton Woods system.
Fixed but adjustable exchange rates would be the new order, but in-
ternational payments imbalances would not be required to affect do-
mestic monetary policy. Although liberalization of trade would be en-
couraged, capital controls were acceptable. The Bretton Woods system
broke down, and we now have a system \vith supposedly market-de-
termined exchange rates that are periodically managed by the indus-
trialized countries; some relaxation of capital controls among the in-
dustrialized countries, but an increasing incidence of a varied lot of
protectionist measures adopted by both industrialized and developing
countries; and monetary growth rates that many central banks deter-
mine by reference to foreign interest rates and exchange rate changes.
Openness seems to me a concept that defies measurement.
2. Dornbusch and Fischer note that asset market linkages in the pre-
World War I and interwar economies were less tight than simple ac-
counts of the gold standard imply. I agree that the evidence does not
support the instantaneous arbitrage in goods and asset markets that
the doctrinaire monetary approach to the balance of payments es-
pouses. On the other hand, I believe that debunking the linkages under
the pre-World War I gold standard can be carried too far. The main
reason for this beliefis that the gold standard would have broken down
if the countries that formally adhered to it in fact did not intend to
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rency. That rules of the gold standard were flouted from time to time
merely confirms that there was leeway to delay the required response.
The proof is that the gold standard did not break down before World
War I. So I would not agree that pre-World War I central banks "fre-
quently sterilized gold flows." They sometimes did for periods oflim-
ited duration that did not compromise the integrity of the standard.
Sterilizationclearly became more generalized during the interwarperiod.
In this connection, the discussion in the paper of Morgenstern's
findings on asset market linkages should be tempered by reference to
George Borts's criticism of both Morgenstern's methodology and his
data.
3. The authors argue that the effects of the Smoot-Hawley tariff of
June 1930 have been substantially exaggerated. There are two views
onthis issue. FrankTaussig regarded thetariffas futile andthe marginal
increase in duties over the Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922 as not
much more damaging. The opposite view that Allan Meltzer has ex-
pressed shows that the two-year period ofthe slow legislative progress
to enactment ofthe Smoot-Hawley bill enabled our trading partners to
retaliate immediately on its passage. World economic welfare clearly
was adversely affected. This argument and Gottfried Haberler's stress
on the intensification of the world depression as a result of the impo-
sition of the tariff and the retaliatory measures that followed seem to
me valid.
Dornbuschand Fischercite thefact thatthe quantity ofUnited States
imports rose smartly in 1922-23 despite the imposition ofthe Fordney-
McCumber tariff, thanks to business expansion. Although the quantity
ofexports declined, that did not interrupt the expansion. The quantity
both of imports and of exports declined in 1931-33 following Smoot-
Hawley, but the decline in import values was much steeper than that
in import quantities. The authors contend that had there been sensible
macroeconomic policy after 1930, the connection that Meltzer finds
between the tariff, declines in exports ofagricultural goods, and bank
failures in agricultural regions would not have resulted in a greatdepres-
sion. Moreover, even a generous allowance for a multiplier effect of
the tariff-based decline in exports would account for only 3% of the
15% decline in United States real GNP between 1929 and 1931. I am
in general agreement with this view, although the effects in the rest of
the world probably were more severe. I do not, however, understand
the statement in the paper, "In addition to the tariff, net exports were,
of course, affected by the extensive competitive depreciation on the
part offoreign countries." What "competitive depreciations"? Is this
a reference to Britain's abandonment of gold in 1931? To the depre-
ciation in 1936 following the United States depreciation in 1933-34?
Were these "competitive"?507 The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Open Economy Linkages
In part 2 of the paper, Dornbusch and Fischer trace open economy
linkages in the goods market, between the goods market and factor
prices, in assetmarkets, andin monetaryandfiscal policies. Themodels
presented are Keynesian. For example, the equation for the goods
marketequilibriumis strictlydemand determined. Thereis no reference
to the possibility that supply reacts to price changes, particularly ifthe
changes are unexpected. The notion of transmission through a multi-
pliereffect offoreign purchases ofhome goods that leads to an increase
in output and employment in my view encourages the drift to protec-
tionism. We know from the current recovery in this country that it is
feasible to achieve a strong growth rate ofreal GNP with a balance of
trade deficit. As the authors note, Darby and Stockman find very weak
multiplier effects in their international model. In a Saint Louis-type
equation for GNP, the evidence presented by Batten and Hafer also
suggests that accountingfor exportactivity is not statistically important
for the Untied States. So emphasis on the linkages between foreign
trade and aggregate demand seem to me overdrawn. International link-
ages are also identified in the terms for wealth and disposable income
that affect the world real interest rate, but the paper admittedly does
not define their impact on the aggregate demand for United States
goods. A final channel mentioned is the \vealth effect of "persistent
international capital movements, for instance, arising from persistent
public sector deficits." I shall refer to the channel in a different context
later on.
The markupprice equationis the basisfor theorizing aboutthe effects
ofa rise in importprices and materials onaggregate demandand supply:
a direct route through the effects ofimport prices on domestic markups
and on costs and thus prices, and indirect routes through the effects
onwage settlementsin industries involved in the internationaleconomy
and the effect of demand pressures from abroad on domestic prices.
Nine quarterly regressions for 1962-83 are presented to test the
theoretical impacts of the external sector on domestic inflation based
on the markup equation, sets of three regressions each with the de-
pendent variable the rate of change first of the GNP deflator, second
ofthe personal consumption deflator, and third ofwages, not otherwise
identified. According to the results, exchange rate changes, the rate of
change ofhourly wage rates and ofoutput per hour in manufacturing,
and the rate of change of the price of oil and gas can explain about
80% of the variance of the deflators. In the regressions on the rate of
change ofwages, exchange rate changes, the log ofunemployment for
married men and expected inflation can explain about 50% ofthe vari-
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rate. Dornbusch and Fischerconclude that exchange rate changes have
relatively quick direct effects on prices and a slower-working indirect
effect on wages.
I believe the results ofthe regressions reflect how someofa necessary
adjustment was worked out. The regressions do not explain why an
adjustment was necessary. A price level equation can of course be
obtained by equating nominal money supply and demand and solving
for the price level. By opening to view the monetary source of the
price rise, such an equation will demonstrate that an adjustment is
necessary.
In considering the asset market, Dornbuschand Fischerindicate that
answers to the questions whether domestic and foreign bonds are per-
fect or imperfect substitutes, whether the stock market should be ac-
corded a role, and whether the redistribution of wealth through the
current account is important for the determination ofthe exchange rate
and macroeconomic equilibrium help analyze the implications of sus-
tained fiscal deficits and of long-term current account deficits. The
conclusion is that under flexible rates, with perfect substitutability an
increase in the money stock leads to overshooting ofthe exchange rate
because prices are sticky, real balances increase, and output expands
while the real and nominal interest rates fall. The ensuing inflation
returns the real exchange rate to its long-run equilibrium value. Thus
monetary and fiscal policy affect the real exchange rate as well as the
real interest rate channel.
Whether overshooting would in fact occur depends on whether in-
flationary expectations come into play when the money stock is in-
creased. Dornbusch and Fischer agree that overshooting is not inevi-
table if output expands initially to raise the nominal interest rate. I
would put it differently. There may be no output effects given infla-
tionary expectations but simply higher nominal interest rates.
The asymmetry in adjustment speeds between goods and asset mar-
kets, they argue, establishes a link between tight money and significant
transitory exchange rate overvaluation. Since tight money works rap-
idly and strongly on the exchange rate, disinflation therefore can take
place more rapidly.
I do not see the close connection between money growth rates and
real exchange rates in 1982 and 1983. During the four quarters of 1982
real exchange rates rose 13%. Ml rose 8.5%. Was that tight nloney?
Inthe first quarterof1983, the real exchange rate fell 3.5% while money
growth accelerated from the fourth quarter 1982 annual rate of 9.9 to
the first quarter 1983 annual rate of 14.3. The deceleration of money
growth in the second quarter of 1983 of one-half a percentage point
was accompanied by an increase in the real exchange rate of2.9%.
To affirm a close connection between money growth rates and the
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ofthe exchange rate as proofthat double-digit money growth rates are
not excessive. This is Martin Feldstein's dubious argument in the 1984
annual report ofthe Council ofEconomic Advisors: "The fact that the
price ofthe dollar in foreign exchange markets remained high through-
out 1983 is a clear signal that the market had confidence in the Federal
Reserve and that the money growth rate was not excessive" (p. 62).
That remains to be seen.
Turning to fiscal policy, Dornbuschand Fischerassumethatsustained
fiscal expansionraiseslong-runaggregatedemand. Ipresumetheymean
budget deficits. Unless monetized, in my view, deficits have no such ef-
fect. Iffinanced by borrowing, deficits will bring about crowding out.
While the crowding-out effect in the goods market is said to lead to
appreciation, clearing asset markets in the case ofdebt finance requires
depreciation to maintain portfolio balance. Whether appreciation or
depreciation will result, the paper says, depends on the relative im-
portance ofportfolio effects versus aggregate demand effects. It seems
clearthattypically portfolioeffects dominate, since budgetdeficits have
usually accompanied depreciating currencies, another reason I do not
believe that deficits raise aggregate demand. Dornbusch and Fischer
conclude that the risk premiums in financing budget deficits by issuing
bonds in the expanding country's currency can be avoided by financing
in the currency ofother countries so that the currency composition of
world outside assets remains unchanged. I note that empirically the
model of diversification has not worked very well.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude by reporting a view ofthe relation between
fiscal and foreign sector deficits that Jan Tumlir presented at a recent
Shadow Open Market Committee meeting. He noted a decline in the
global savings ratio attributable to unprecedented fiscal deficits in both
industrial and developing countries and the swing from a large current
account surplus toa deficit ofthe OPECgroup. Countriesarecompeting
for the limited supply ofworld savings. While the savings ratio in Japan
is 30% ofGNP, in the UnitedStatesit currentlyis only 150/0-16%. Japan,
faced with intense trade discrimination abroad, cannot find investment
opportunities at home to absorb its national savings. In the United States,
on the otherhand, investment opportunities are growing so rapidly that
domestic savings cannot finance them without inflation. The United
States therefore turns to foreign sources of savings. The only way to
borrow capital abroad is through a current account deficit.
Tumlir remarked that the role of the real exchange rate in hurting
United States exporters has been exaggerated. Despite the high ex-
change rate of the dollar, cyclical conditions abroad, and increased
competition for export orders in the rest of the world, United States
total real exports during the initial twelve-month period following the510 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
business cycle trough in November 1982 rose at a somewhat higher
rate than they did in the comparable periods following the troughs of
March 1975 and July 1980. Only United States real exports to oil-
exporting LDCs are currently depressed. At the same time, the ex-
change rate helps keep domesticprices more competitive. Inanyevent,
exchange rate changes are not an independent contribution to inflation
or deflation but an integral part of the mechanism by which inflation
or deflation develops from the original monetary impulse.
Tumlir ended his remarks by noting possible outcomes given the cur-
rent account deficit that provides the foreign capital in the absence of
adequate savings to finance all attractive United States investment op-
portunities. Underfree trade, the industries mostaffectedbythe import
competition would be those with the least attractive investment oppor-
tunities. Their shrinkage would be irreversible when the investment cycle
ran its course or fiscal deficits ended. When a government grants pro-
tection to selected industries, however, investment prospects improve
in these industries. Industries with more promising prospects then face
intensified competitionfrom abroad, since the imports through which it
wouldhavebeenmosteconomicaltotransferthecapitalfromabroadare
restrained. The more promising prospects in the unprotected industries
willdeteriorate,andresourceswillbeshiftedtotheprotectedindustries.
The implication I draw from Tumlir's analysis is that the problem is
not the current account deficit or the strong dollar. The problem is the
world's low savings ratio, which fiscal deficits exacerbate. As for the
level of the real interest rate, it is clearly positive now after years of
negative real rates. Whether real rates are regarded as above their
equilibrium level depends on an estimate of inflationary expectations.
I doubt that averaging the last three years of actual inflation is an
adequate measure ofUnited States and world market expectations. We
shall do more to restore real rates to whatever their equilibrium level
is by eliminating once and for all the recurrence ofvariable and rising
inflation rates.
Discussion Summary
Robert Gordon took issue with the large total effect ofexchange rates
on wages and prices found by the authors. He noted that the effect
was much greaterthan he had found previously and that, in retrospect,
even his coefficients had overstated the impact of exchange rate ap-
preciation on inflation in 1981-83. He felt their finding was due to their
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price markups to depend on domestic demand or to attribute some of
the acceleration of inflation in 1974 to the lifting of wage and price
controls.
Robert Eisner and Geoffrey Moore both expressed concern that the
authors had examined the role of foreign variables on the GNP price
deflator, which, they argued, wouldfall whenimportprices rose, ceteris
paribus. Moore noted that the gross domestic purchases deflator did
not have this defect and, in addition, was more comprehensive than
the deflator for consumers' expenditure.
Allan Meltzer elaborated on his analysis of the effects of tariffs on
the domestic economy. He noted that the Fordney-McCumber tariff
was harder to dismiss as a contributor to the 1923 recession than was
the Smoot-Hawley tariff in the Great Depression. He noted that the
retaliation to the Smoot-Hawley tariffmay, however, have exacerbated
the Great Depression through its impact on agricultural land prices and
income, and hence on bank failures in agricultural areas.
Stanley Fischer doubted that the strong impact ofexchange rates on
output was due to the authors' omission of a variable to capture the
relaxation of price controls in 1974, since the lags in the estimated
equation were too short to allow price controls to work in the manner
Gordon suggested, but he did concede that the price expectations term
estimated was possibly misleading. Rudiger Dornbusch noted that ag-
ricultural prices in the rest ofthe world fell by more than those in the
United States in the Great Depression. Thus United States agricultural
tariffs kept domestic prices higher than world prices and could not have
caused land prices to fall by more than they would have without tariffs.
References
Aghevli, Bijan B. 1975. The balance of payments and money supply
under the gold standard regime: U.S. 1879-1914. American Eco-
nomic Review 65 (March): 40-58.
Amano, Akihiro, Akira Sadahiro, and Takahiro Sasaki. 1981. Structure
and application of the EPA world econometric model. Economic
Planning Agency, Tokyo.
Annual report ofthe Council ofEconomic Advisers. 1984 In Economic
report of the president. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office.
Batten, Dallas S., and Rik W. Hafer. 1983. 'fhe relative impact ofmon-
etary and fiscal actions on economic activity: A cross-country com-512 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
parison. [Federal Reserve Bank ofSaint Louis] Review 65 (January):
5-12.
Black, Stanley W. 1985. The effects ofalternative intervention policies
on the variability ofexchange rates: The Harrod effect. In Exchange
rate management under uncertainty, ed. Jagdeep Bhandari. Cam-
bridge: MIT Press.
Blanchard, Olivier. 1983. Debt, deficits, and finite horizons. Unpub-
lished manuscript, MIT.
Blinder, Alan. 1982. The anatomy ofdouble digit inflation in the 1970s.
In Inflation: Causes and effects, ed. Robert Hall. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
Bloomfield, Arthur I. 1959. Monetary policy under the international
gold standard: 1880-1914. New York: Federal Reserve Bank.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 1983. FRB mul-
ticountry model: Version August. Washington, D.C.: Board ofGov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System.
Borts, George H. 1964. Review ofInternationalfinancial transactions
andbusiness cycles, by OskarMorgenstern. JournaloftheAmerican
Statistical Association 59 (March): 223-28.
Branson, William. 1980. Trends in United States international trade
and investment. In The American economy in transition, ed. Martin
Feldstein. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Branson, William, and Willem Buiter. 1983. Monetary and fiscal policy
with flexible exchange rates. In Economic interdependence andflex-
ible exchange rates, ed. Jagdeep S. Bhandari and Bluford H. Put-
nam. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bruno, Michael, and Jeffrey Sachs. 1985. The economics ofworldwide
stagflation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Buiter, Willem, and Marcus Miller. 1982. Real exchange rate over-
shooting and the output cost of bringing down inflation. European
Economic Review 18, 1:85-123.
Canzoneri, Matthew, and Jo Anna Gray. 1983. Monetary policy games
and the consequences ofnon-cooperative behavior. International Fi-
nance Discussion Paper no. 219, Federal Reserve Board.
Cardoso, Eliana. 1983. Exchange rates and the stock market. Unpub-
lished manuscript, Boston University.
Cumby, Robert E., and Maurice Obstfeld. 1982. International interest-
rate and price-level linkages under flexible exchange rates: A review
ofrecentevidence. Working Paper921, National BureauofEconomic
Research.
Darby, Michael R., James R. Lothian, Arthur E. Gandolfi, Anna J.
Schwartz, and Alan C. Stockman. 1983. The international transmis-
sion ofinflation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Darby, Michael R., and Alan C. Stockman. 1983. The Mark III inter-
national transmission model: Estimates. In The international trans-513 The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
missionofinflation, ed. Michael R. Darby et al. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Dornbusch, Rudiger. 1976. Expectations and exchange rate dynamics.
Journal ofPolitical Economy 84 (December):1161-76.
---. 1982a. Equilibrium and disequilibrium exchange rates. Zeit-
schriftfur Wirtschafts-und-Sozialwissenschaften 102 (6):573-99.
---. 1982b. Exchange rate risk and the macroeconomics of ex-
change rate determination. In The internationalization offinancial
markets and national economic policy, ed. Robert Hawkins et al.
Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.
---. 1983. Flexible exchange rates and interdependence. IMFStaff
Papers 30 (March): 3-30.
Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Paul Krugman. 1976. Flexible exchange
rates in the short run. Brookings PajJers on Economic Activity
3:537-76.
Driskill, Robert. 1981. Exchange rate dynamics: An empirical inves-
tigation. Journal ofPolitical Economy 89 (April): 357- 71.
Frankel, Jeffrey. 1982. In search of the exchange rate risk premium.
Journal ofInternational Money and Finance 1:255- 74.
---. 1983. Intervention in foreign exchange markets. Federal Re-
serve Bulletin 69 (November): 830-36.
Frenkel, Jacob. 1981. The collapse ofpurchasing power parity during
the 1970's. European Economic Review 16 (May): 145-65.
---, ed. 1983. Exchange rates and international macroeconomics.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Friedman, Milton, and Anna J. Schwartz. 1963. A monetary history
of the United States, 1867-1960. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Giovannini, Alberto. 1982. Essays on flexible exchange rates. Ph.D.
diss., Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology.
Gordon, Robert J. 1973. The response of'wages and prices to the first
two years of controls. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 3:
765-78.
---. 1982. Inflation, flexible exchange rates, and the natural rate of
unemployment. In Workers, jobs, andin.flation, ed. Martin N. Baily,
89-153. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Haberler, Gottfried. 1976. The world economy, money, and the Great
Depression, 1919-1939. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute.
Hacche, Graham. 1983. The determinants ofexchange rate movements.
Working Paper, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
Hansen, Lars Peter, and Robert J. Hodrick. 1980. Forward exchange
rates as optimal predictors of future spot rates: An econometric
analysis. Journal ofPolitical Economy 88:829-53.514 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
Henderson, Dale W. Exchange market intervention operations: Their
role in financial policy and theireffects. In Exchange rate theory and
practice, ed. John F. O. Bilson and Richard C. Marston, 359-406.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Katseli-Papaefstratiou, Louka T. 1979. The reemergence of the pur-
chasing power parity doctrine in the 1970's. Special Papers in
International Economics, no. 13. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Keynes, J. M. 1930. A treatise on money, vol. 2. NewYork: Macmillan.
Kindleberger, Charles P. 1973. The world in depression, 1929-1939.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
---. 1978. Manias, panics, and crashes. New York: Basic Books.
Klein, Philip A., and Geoffrey H. Moore. 1983. The leading indicator
approach to economic forecasting: Retrospect and prospect. Journal
ofForecasting 2, no. 2:119-35.
Kravis, Irving, and Robert Lipsey. 1983. Toward a theory ofnational
price levels. Princeton Studies in International Finance. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Larsen, F., et al. 1983. International economic linkages. OECD Eco-
nomic Studies, no. 1 (Autumn).
Laursen, S., and L. Metzler. 1950. Flexible exchange rates and the
theory ofemployment. Review ofEconomics and Statistics 32 (Feb-
ruary): 281-99.
League of Nations. 1942. Commercial policy in the interwar period:
International proposals and national policies. Geneva: League of
Nations.
Loopesko, Bonnie E. 1983. Relationships among exchange rates, in-
tervention, andinterest rates:An empiricalinvestigation. StaffStud-
ies no. 133. Washington, D.C.: Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal
Reserve System.
McKinnon, Ronald. 1982. Currency Substitution and the world dollar
standard. American Economic Review 72 (June): 320-33.
Meade, James. 1951. The balance ofpayments. London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Meese, Richard A., and Kenneth Rogoff. 1983. Empirical exchange
rate models of the seventies. Journal ofInternational ,Economics
14:3-24.
Meltzer, Allan H. 1976. Monetary and other explanations of the start
of the Great Depression. Journal ofMonetary Economics (Novem-
ber): 455-71.
Melvin, Michael. 1983. An alternative approach to international capital
flows. In The international transmission of inflation, ed. Michael
Darby et aI., chap. 13. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.515 The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Mintz, lIse. 1959. Trade balances during business cycles: u.s. and
Britain since 1880. Occasional Paper67. New York: National Bureau
of Economic Research.
---. 1967. Cyclicalf/uctuations in the exports ofthe United States
since 1879. New York: Columbia University Press.
Morgenstern, Oskar. 1955. The validityofinternationalgoldmovement
statistics. Special Papers in International ~Economics,no. 2. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press.
---. 1959. Internationalfinancial transactions and business cycles.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mundell, Robert A. 1964. Problems of monetary and exchange rate
management in Canada. NationalBankingReview 2 (September):85.
Mussa, Michael. 1984. The theory of exchange rate determination. In
Exchange rate theory and practice, ed. John F. O. Bilson and
Richard C. Marston, 13-78. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Nordhaus, William. 1972. The worldwide \\'age explosion. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 2:431-64.
Nurkse, R. 1978. International currency eXj}erience. New York: Arno
Press. Originally published 1944.
Obstfeld, Maurice. 1982. Canwe sterilize?Theoryand evidence. Amer-
ican Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings (May), 45-50.
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Alan Stockman. 1983. Exchange-rate dynam-
ics. Manuscript, Columbia University.
Pierce, James L., and Jared J. Enzler. 1974. The effects of external
inflationary shocks. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:13-
54.
Razin, Assaf, and Lars Svensson, 1983. The terms of trade and the
current account: The Harberger-Laursen-·Metzler effect. Journal of
Political Economy 91 (February): 97-125.
Rogoff, Kenneth. 1983. Time series studies ofthe relationship between
exchange rates and intervention: A review of the techniques and
literature. Staff Study 132, Federal Reserve Board.
--_. 1984. Productive and counterproductive cooperative monetary
policies. Manuscript, International Finance Division, Federal Re-
serve Board.
Sachs, Jeffrey. 1980. Wages, flexible exchange rates, and macroeco-
nomic policy. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 64:269-319.
Sayers, R. S. 1958. Central banking after "Bagehot. London: Oxford
University Press.
Schwartz, Anna J. 1981. Understanding 1929-1933. In The Great
Depression revisited, ed. Karl Brunner. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Stern, Robert, et al. 1976. Price elasticities in international trade: An
annotated bibliography. London: Butterworth.516 Rudiger Dornbusch/Stanley Fischer
Taussig, F. W. 1964. The tariff history of the United States. Minne-
apolis: Capricorn Books.
Tumlir, Jan. 1984. Trade restrictions imposed in 1983 (report to the
Shadow Open Market Committee). Mimeographed.
Wyplosz, Charles, and Jeffrey Sachs. 1984. Real exchange rate effects
of fiscal policy. Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Yoshitomi, M. 1984. The insulating and transmission mechanism of
floating exchange rates analyzed by the EPA world econometric model.
Economic Planning Agency, Tokyo.